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This dissertation essentially examines the context and the conduct of elections held in 
the southern African region, particularly in Namibia and Mozambique between 1989 
and 1999. These elections crystallized a wider process of democratization during the 
last decade, in which attempts were made to shift from various forms of authoritarian 
rule (colonial or racial oligarchies, military regimes, one-party states, or presidential 
rule) to pluralist parliamentary politics. 
Southern Africa apparently holds some of the best examples of the realizations of 
liberal democracy in the period between 1989 and 1999 in the region. The cases are of 
particular interest because in the states, the incumbent governing parties were 
constituted from the liberation movements that led the countries to liberation from 
colonial, colonial-settler and racially oppressive systems. This affected not only the 
durability of these governments, but also their operations in dealing with the defense 
and the growth of political power. The two states have also been closely observed 
through the holding of the first multiparty elections by the United Nations. 
This study is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the post-conflict 
elections. In this case the international community has assisted K amibia and 
Mozambique in various ways. The second part focuses on the electoral management 
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The end of the Cold War has heralded the emergence ofa new era. It is a time in which a 
series of intense protracted conflicts in the Southern African region have been terminated 
and peace agreements brokered. After years, and in some cases decades of wars, there are 
now new possibilities for democratization, democratic consolidation and peace. Since the 
end of the Cold War, interest in the concept of democratization has been revived with it 
being interpreted from political, social and cultura1.! 
It is in this context of conceptualizing democracy that the process of democratic transition 
requires greater attention. In general, democratization, this can be defined as a transition 
from non-democratic to democratic regimes. However, by distinguishing between 
electoral and liberal democracy, a distinction must be made between a first transition 
from authoritarianism towards the installation of a democratically elected government by 
founding elections and a second transitional process towards a consolidated and 
institutionalized democracy. 2 
Given the endurance of colonial rule in Southern Africa, much of the region has only 
gained experience with the administration of multiparty eleetions over the course of 
democratic transitions in the last decade of the twentieth century. Many of these elections 
have been held in post-conflict societies with the assistance, supervision or some times 
direct control of the international community. The basic principle that government should 
be chosen by the ballot, not the bullet, has become enshrined as an emerging right in 
intemationallaw. 
In post-conflict societies, competitive elections have become one of the instruments used 
not only to promote democracy but also to attempt to consolidate a fragile peace. In such 
I Lamb. G: Demilitarization and Peacebuildingin Southern Africa: A Survey of the Literature. p. 1 
2 Andrea E, 0: Mozambique the Permanent Entrenchment of Democratic Minimalism? In: African Review 










cases, elections provide an inevitable means for jump-starting a new, post-conflict 
political order; for stimulating the development democratic politics; for choosing 
representatives; for forming governments; and for conferring legitimacy upon the new 
political order. For all of these reasons, elections have become a central political 
mechanism for choosing governments and thus a central aspect of the process of 
democratization.3 
Without reinvestigating the vast body of literature on democratization and elections, and 
without questioning the importance of the place of elections in democratization, this 
study secks to offer more than just an account of what happened in two Southern African 
states, Namibia and Mozambique, from 1989 to 1999. 
The year 1989 was a historic and eventful milestone for Namibia. The final stage of 
decolonization in Africa was at last to be played out. A cease-fire beginning in April 
heralded the end of the long drawn-out war that had been waged by fighters of the South 
West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to dislodge the occupying South African 
security forces. The United Nations, which had been passing resolutions challenging 
South African overrule and been acting to assert its own trusteeship, finally would 
establish a presence in the country to oversee a transition to peace and eventually, in 
1990, to full independence. The culmination of this process would be the first fully open 
elections in Namibia, in November 1989, to choose an assembly that would write a 
constitution for the country. The elections and the work of the Constituent Assembly 
(AC) in tum would set the main parameters for the post independence political system; 
they would shape the party system and the legal framework of the state structures.4 
In Mozambique, the adoption of political reforms began when Frelimo's Central 
Committee agreed on a new constitution in 1990. Two years later, the General Peace 
Agreement (GPA) provided the key step that made the introduction of multiparty politics 
3 Reilly, B: International Electoral Assistance: A Review of Donor Activities and Lessons Learned. In: 
Working Paper No" 17,2003. p.9 











an actual possibility. The OP A was an agreement between the top leadership of the two 
sides, Frelimo and Renamo which, from the start, marginalized every other voice, notably 
those of the unnamed political oppositions. The OP A entrenched the key principles for 
co-operation between Frelimo and Renamo and the institutionalization of multiparty 
democracy in Mozambique.5 The implementation of most of the key provisions of the 
OPA was placed in the hands of the United Nations, which was called upon to facilitate 
the process of demilitarization and the movement to democracy. The country's first 
pluralist elections, held in 1994, established a formally competitive system, which opened 
the political arena to Renamo. 6 
In both states the immediate political outcome was the establishment of a governing party 
faced with a significant opposition, a constitution, and for the moment, political practices 
that guarantee pluralist competition. This case study examines essentially the election 
management machinery of Namibia and Mozambique with special reference to the 
political, legal and administrative framework in which the Presidential and National 
Assembly elections were held. An attempt will also be made to determine whether there 
exist in Namibia and Mozambique certain elements which are universally recognized as 
essential to the promotion of etTective pluralism and honest political competition, because 
elections are now part of the processes that constitute action for the achievement and the 
retention of political power in Southern Africa. 
Namibia and Mozambique were chosen for this study because the incumbent governing 
parties were constituted by the liberation movements that led them to liberation from 
colonial, colonial-settler and racially oppressive systems. Established in Dar es-Salaam in 
1962, SWAPO and Frelimo were forged by the anti-colonial war fought against South 
Africa and Portugal. At the beginning of the liberation struggle the Republic of Zambia 
was a budding infrastructure, from which SWAPO and Frelimo established a guerrilla 
5 Alden, C: The United Nations Elections and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique. In: Journal of 
Modern African Studies VoUl, No.1, 1995. p. 65 
6 Giovanni M, C: Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Party System. In: 











network. 7 In both states the principal problems confronting UNTAG and ONUMOZ 
were the long delay in the initial deployment of the peace-keeping contingents. It was 
both the former liberation movements that won the first and the second general elections.8 
Using a comparative approach to elections in Namibia and Mozambique, this study is 
divided in two parts: the first examines the post-conflict elections, and the second deals 
with the post democratic elections. 
7 Booysen, S: Liberation Meets Liberal Democracy: A Framework for the Comparison of Action to Contest 
and Retain Political Power in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique. p.2 











PART ONE: POST -CONFLICT ELECTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
This part will explore the post-conflict elections in Namibia 1989 and Mozambique 1994. 
Elections after conflict are fundamentally different from those organized under normal 
circumstances. Post-conflict elections are designed to facilitate, or to symbolize, an end to 
intrastate conflicts. The decision to hold elections is negotiated at the time of a peace 
accord. The purpose of such post-conflict elections is a dual one: like all elections, they 
seek to install a legitimate, democratic government; in addition, they also attempt to 
consolidate fragile peace agreements into a lasting peace under a democratic system. 
Most post-conflict elections occur after the negotiation of peace accords that involve 
most, if not all, the parties to the conflict. The peace accords afford a major role to 
external actors (either an international organization or a group of nations), often involving 
the deployment of military or police forces to the country emerging from the conflict. The 
external actors generally themselves commit to assuming a major role in administering, 
supervising, observing, funding, and otherwise supporting the elections. Finally, the 
elections often take place while reconstruction efforts are still in their infancy, refugees 
and internally displaced persons have not returned to their original places of residence, 
and land mines are still laid and make travel difficult in certain regions of the country.9 
Namibia and Mozambique had a post-conflictual past because the elections were held in 
the aftermath of violent internal conflict. Despite negotiations and signing of a peace 
accord, post-conflict societies remain highly fragmented, polarized, and prone to 
violence. 











Deep political cleavages between the warring groups have not yet been bridged, nor have 
the various factions come to share the same a genuine commitment to democracy and 
reconciliation. In spite of the fragile nature of the states, elections were held with 











CHAPTER ONE: OBJECTIVES AND PRECONDITIONS OF POST-CONFLICT 
ELECTIONS 
1.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS 
At the end of a civil war, there tends to be a consensus among the conflicting political 
parties, many civil society organizations, and particularly the international community, 
that the country should have democratic systems to select a new government or 
constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. The most obvious objective of post-
conflict elections is to transfer power to a democratic government that enjoys national 
and international legitimacy and is able to start rebuilding the country. The principle is 
that people should choose their governments through free and fair elections' 10 
The second objective of post-conflict elections is to initiate and consolidate the 
democratization process in the country. At least in public discourse, elt~ctions are viewed 
not as one-time events but as a first step toward nurturing democratic institutions after the 
war. 
The third objective of post-conflict elections is to promote reconciliation between the 
parties that were formerly at war with each other. Post-conflict elections are supposed to 
transform a violent conflict into a non-violent one. They are expected to enable the 
fonner warring parties to pursue their conflicting ideologies and programs in a peaceful 
fashion. Elections give all factions an opportunity to present their agendas to the citizens' 
debate with their opponents, and mobilize public opinion to capture political power. Like 
other elements of democratic system, elections contribute to the institutionalization of a 
conflict resolution mechanism in the body politic. II 
10 Krishima, K: Post conflict elections. Democratization and Intemation!il Assistance. p. 6 











1.2 THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES 
In many post-conflict countries, the international community maintains multinational 
peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the United Nations to monitor a cease-fire and 
to prevent the renewal of hostilities. These forces are crucial to successful elections. Their 
presence gives a sense of security to the citizenry and a moderating influence upon those 
who may not be reconciled to a peaceful settlement. They also provide a wide range of 
support services for post conflict elections, to their efficient transformation, 
communication, and other logistic facilities. 12 
UNTAG, launched in Namibia in April 1989, was the first United Nations 
multifunctional peace-support operation. The deployment followed the signature of the 
Brazzaville Protocol by Angola, Cuba and South Africa, stipulating that Namibia would 
become a fully sovereign country and free and fair elections for a constituent assembly 
would be held. The mandate of the UNT AG was threefold, as is typical for a 
multifunctional peace-support operation: firstly, the main military tasks consisted of 
verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces, verifying of the cease-fire and monitoring of 
the cantonment. Secondly, the civilian mandate contained three main elements: the 
establishment of regional and district offices for explanation and assistance of internal 
reconciliation, the supervision of the civil administration reform process, and, most 
impo11antly, organization and supervision of the electoral process. Thirdly, the police 
component of the mandate consisted of the supervision of the local police. UNT AG was 
withdrawn in March 1990 after having completed its mandate. 13 
ONUMOZ has been the most modem multifunctional peace-support operation launched. 
It was established to facilitate the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, 
signed on 4 October 1992 in Rome by the president of the Republic of Mozambique and 
the President of the Resistance National Mozambique (Renamo). Again, the mandate was 
12 Ibid. p. 9 











threefold: the military mandate consisted primarily of the monitoring the cease-fire, the 
cantonment of the forces, and their demobilization. The most important tasks of the 
civilian component were the monitoring of the entire electoral process and the co-
ordination of humanitarian assistance. The police unit supervised the performance of the 
local police. After free and fair presidential and legislative elections in October 1994, and 
the installation of Mozambique's new Parliament and the inauguration of the President of 
Mozambique in early December, ONUMOZ was withdrawn at the end of January 1995. 14 
1.3 CREATING POLITICAL PREREQUISITES 
Competitive elections require a set of minimal conditions, such as freedom of expression, 
movement and organization, existence of political parties that can field candidates and 
mount election campaigns; and physical security to the people. Probably the most 
important role of the international community in post-conflict elections is helping the 
country to develop a legal and institutional electoral infrastructure. Three areas have been 
targeted: the establishment of independent election commissions, the organization of 
rudimentary administrative structures that can manage logistical tasks; and the 
strengthening of indigenous civil society organizations capable of undertaking voter 
education and monitoring elections. IS In their activities, the UN-peacekeeping forces are 
supposed to ensure that all these minimal conditions prevail. 
However, one of the major constraints facing ~TAG in Namibia, was the fact that the 
Special Representative of UNT AG lacked the authority to enforce his recommendations. 
The power to implement decisions lay entirely with the Administrator-General, to whom 
the SR would have to make submissions. 16Thus, in effect, the UN plan did not provide 
for UNTAG assuming control of Namibia. No interim government was to oversee the 
transitional process in Namibia; instead an Administrator- General (AG) would replace 
the dissolved Transitional Government of National Unity, which had been in office since 
14 Alden, C: The United Nations and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique. In: JouIT)~1 of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 31, No.1, 1995. p. 69 











1985. 17 Although South Africa was to have no military control in Namibia, the South 
Africa appointed Administrator- General (AG) Louis Pienaar, retained full administrative 
control of the country during transition, subject to the supervision of the SR. The AG's 
power were extensive, including primary responsibility for law and order via command 
of SWAPOL (South West Africa Police) and drafting all legislation relevant to the 
transitional process and conducting elections. 18 
Thus, the AG, due to his contact with the local institutions and oppressive structures put 
in place by the South Africans, could provide South Africa with major opportunities to 
influence the outcome of election. However, an argument was made that this could be 
countered by the fact that the SR had the power to declare the elections free and fair at 
every stage of the transition process, but nevertheless, the AG was responsible for the 
implementation of all legislation relating to the transition. Thus the SR would have been 
placed in a position were he would continually have to negotiate with the AG in order to 
achieve any reforms to legislation. 19 
In Mozambique by contrast, there were many dangers. The price of peace implied a 
dramatic contraction of state power, already in crisis, which limited the ability to govern, 
that is, to forecast events, take initiatives and measures to solve the country's problems, 
and guarantee basic living conditions for citizens. Principally, the state, because of the 
demobilization (necessary for the success of the peace process and uncontrollable in any 
case found that its ability to ensure law and order and repress crime was worryingly 
reduced. 20 
16 Harlech-Iones, B: A New Thing? Nafllibian Independence Proces§J289-1990. p. 57 
17 Saunders, C: Transition in Namibia 1989-1990, and the South Africa case. p. 17 
1& Hearn, R: UN Peacekeeping in Action: The Namibian Experience. p. 64 
19 Ibid. p. 64 











Renamo's project of affirming itself as a counter-power, which was clear in the stance 
taken by the organization immediately after signing the peace accord, was also affected. 
The management of the political and administrative power which Renamo had exercised 
until then in the areas under its influence began to conflict with the functions of the 
government, recognized in the accord. This brought Renamo under criticism and pressure 
from ONUMOZ and sectors of the international community.21 
Renamo expected, and wanted, special rights over the areas under its influence; it wanted 
a share in taxes and fees raised and in investments undertaken there, but the limits 
imposed by the peace accord made that illegal. Although Renamo to some extent 
persisted with these aims, it brought it under easy and effective criticism from the 
government and under strong international pressure. Once Renamo was transformed from 
a military organization into Renamo-Party, with pluralism in the country's political life 
ensured, and with the tactical alternative of a military option defeated, the minimum 
conditions envisaged in Rome for pushing ahead with preparing the elections and with 
the election campaign itself now existed. The imminent competition for power made a 
new dynamic appear. Since the start of implementing the peace accord, Frelimo had 
maintained it traditional strategy based on strengthening the elements bringing society 
together.22 
1.4 REPATRIATION PROGRAM 
The ongoing war m Namibia and in Mozambique had resulted in significant 
displacement, as people were forced to leave their respective countries. In Namibia, 
many people had left the country to join the resistance movement, SWAPO or were 
refugees, the majority was living in Angola and Zambia. However the liberation war had 
seen people dispersed all over the world, many living in exile for decades.23 Mozambique 
emerged in October 1992 from a sixteen-year civil war that has displaced 4 million 
21 Ibid. p. 94 
22 Ibid. p. 95 











Mozambicans and 1.7million who had fled to flee to neighboring countries. War ravaged 
Mozambique's infrastructure and economy leaving the country divided and in ruins?4The 
return of refugees was seen as critical under the terms of the UN settlement plan for 
Namibia and Mozambique. A major duty of the UN in facilitating the return of the 
refugees was to ensure that conditions within Namibia and Mozambique were conducive 
to their safe return. 
The United Nations plan for Namibia stated that the exile should be able to return without 
risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. There as set out in the settlement 
plan for Namibia, a number of conditions had to be met before the repatriation program 
could commence. Given the immense powers maintained by the Administrator-General in 
the area of administering the telTitory during the transition period, most of the reforms 
could only be implemented through his office. This (like so many other aspects of the UN 
operation) resulted in the need for extensive and painstaking negotiations between the 
offices of the Special Representative and the Administrator-Genera1.25 
One of the most critical aspects for ensuring of the returnees was the introduction of a 
general amnesty so as to ensure that those activities committed during the liberation 
struggle would not result in the arrest of returning exiles. However the Administrator 
General attempted to make a distinction between common law and political offences, 
which have potentially resulted in prosecution for those charged with common law 
offences.26 
Other issues arose at this time, intensifying negotiations and adding to the delays in 
starting the repatriation program. First were the discriminatory and repressive laws still in 
place in Namibia, which could have been used for the purposes of intimidation. A second 
issue was related to the question of nationality. Under R435 the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was required to register Namibian refugees before 
24 Turner Michael, J. Sue, N. & Kimberly Mahling, C: Mozambique's vote for Democratic governance. [n: 
Post conflict elections, Democratization and International Assistance. p. 153 











the repatriation commenced. The Administrator General expressed concern that those 
returning were in fact Namibians; he therefore attempted to make the forwarding of all 
registration forms to Windhoek a requirement for repatriation. The UNHCR stated that 
this was not usual practice and that it would lead to major delays in the exiles return.27 
This intransigence ultimately paid off when the Administrator General and the South 
African authorities finally acquiesced to the UN's demands, with the South African 
President signing a proclamation on 6 June repealing all apartheid legislation and 
providing for a general amnesty for Namibian guerrillas. This paved the way for the 
return of the more than 42,000 refugees and exiles. In Namibia, the UNHCR worked in 
conjunction with the Council of Churches of Namibia (CCN) to repatriate exiled 
Namibians located primarily in Angola and Zambia, although there were others from 44 
different countries. The CCN, had been approached by the UN Special Representative for 
Namibia in 1978 to assist with the repatriation, provided most of the facilities and staffing 
for the program, which was named the Coordinating Committee for Repatriation, 
Resettlement and Reconstruction (RRR). A number of other international organizations 
were involved in the resettlement program, including the world Food Program, the World 
Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.28 
In Mozambique, the signing of the General Peace Agreement in October 1992 and the 
opening up of districts that Renamo had controlled or held under siege prompted the 
spontaneous return of large numbers of displaced persons and refugees. The decision to 
establish a humanitarian assistance component to ONUMOZ was supported by the 
Mozambican parties and was approved by the international community. In July 1992, the 
joint request of the Government and Renamo that the United Nations coordinated the 
provision of humanitarian assistance became an integral part of the final peace accord. 
Subsequently, the Security Council, in its Resolution 797 (1992), endorsed the inclusion 
of the coordination of humanitarian assistance operation within the overall mandate of 
26 Ibid. p. 207 
27 Ibid. p. 209 











ONUMOZ, as delineated in the UN report for the humanitarian emergency was mobilized 
by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs.29 
The key agency involved in the humanitarian effort was UNOHAC. It was formally 
established at the International Donors Conference in December 1992 in terms of the 
Declaration on Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance signed by the 
Government and Renamo earlier in the year.30 Repatriating refugees and internally 
displaced persons was another high priority of the humanitarian assistance programme. 
With over one million Mozambicans outside the country, there were fears that the onset 
of peace would bring an uncontrolled influx of "returnees" putting a tremendous strain on 
the already stretched capacity of existing resources and institutions designed to cope with 
emergency situations.31 
In carrying out its mandate, UNOHAC sought to utilize the range of development and 
refugees support agencies, which traditionally worked in the field of humanitarian 
assistance. Refugee's resettlement was the first priority of the humanitarian assistance 
programme. Mozambican refugees had settled in large numbers in Malawi (1,058,500), 
Zimbabwe (137,900), Zambia (25,400), Swaziland (24,000), Tanzania (20,000) and 
South Africa (250,000), The UNHCR, as well as a plethora of NGO's had invested 
millions of dollars in creating refugees camps.32 
1.5 DELIMITARIZATION AND DISARMAMENT OF COMBATANTS. 
In the Namibian case, the UN mission's involvement in demilitarization was conceived 
wholly in terms of short-term objectives, that is to say, the demobilization and 
disarmament of combatants. No provisions for reintegration of former soldiers were 
29 The United Nations and Mozambiqlle 1992- 1995. p. 47 
30 Alden, C: The United Nations, Elections and Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique. In: War and Peace 
in Mozambique, Vol. 32, No.4, 1995. p. 75 
31 Ibid. p. 74 











introduced in the programme. The first aspect of the UNT AG role in demilitarization 
centred around the supervision of the confinement and withdrawal of South African 
troops from the territory and the concomitant repatriation of SW APO guerrillas from 
their bases in southern Angola and Zambia. 33 The second aspect of UNT AG' s role in 
demilitarization was the monitoring of the Namibian police and those elements of the 
SADF which had taken up civilian functions during the transition period. Complicating 
the situation further was the incorporation of the notorious counter-insurgency unit, 
Koevoet (Crowbar) into the SW APOL. With SW APOL given the principal role in 
maintaining law and order during the transitional period.34 
The implementation of the demilitarization programme was subject to the problems and 
constraints facing UNTAG. UNTAG peacekeeping troops were decreased from 7,000 to 
4,650. Moreover, only 1,000 of these troops were on the ground by the 1 April lacking 
much needed equipment such as mine-protected vehicles. 35 The first and dangerous crisis 
came in the early days of the UN mission with the unexpected infiltration of hundreds of 
SW APO guerrillas from their bases over the border. Immediately SW APOL and koevoet 
forces engaged the PLAN fighters. 36 These events resulted in threats of South Africa 
demanding the suspension of the peace process, withdrawing from the Tripartite 
Agreement and the cancellation of the implementation of 435, if these PLAN forces were 
not driven back over the border. South Africa also threatened to remobilize the SADF in 
Namibia if the PLAN insurgents were not dealt with properly.37 
Another issue, which clouded the demilitarization process, was the incorporation of the 
Koevoet into the police force. Most reported cases of intimidation and human rights 
abuse in the Ovambo areas came from SWAPOL and Koevoet. 38 Much of the formal 
disarmament and demobilization process was effectively run outside of the UNTAG 
33 Alden, C: The UN's experience of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration in Southern Africa. 
E· 2 .4Ibid.p.5 
35 Ibid. p. 4 
36 Hearn, R: The UN Peacekeeping in Action: The Namibian Experience. p. 91 
37 Nujoma, S: Where Others Wavered. p.396 











framework with the UN playing the role of observer or monitor. In the case of SW APO, 
disarmament took place in Angola and Zambia followed by registration of repatriated 
refugees, inclusive of former guerrillas, at selected Assembly Areas over a seven-day 
period.39 The SW A TF disbanded in advance of the UNT AG mission and, though its arms 
were stored on South African military bases, the UN had difficulty gaining access to 
these facilities to verify their contents.40 The demobilization of Koevoet was made a 
week before the elections.4 ! 
The demilitarization programme in Mozambique, in contrast to the Namibian examples, 
adopted an approach which deliberately sought to link short-term objectives with long-
tetm goals. ONUMOZ put together a coordinated effort, which rivaled UNTAG in size 
but far exceeded it in breadth. The demilitarization programme employed by ONUMOZ 
sought to integrate the international community's efforts in supp0l1ing short and long-
term demilitarization. Short-term components included the monitoring of the cease-fire 
and the supervision of the demobilization of combatants. Long-tetID components focused 
on the projects, which targeted ex-combatants, including provisions for two-year subsidy, 
job referral and training programmes.42 
Monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique, a condition Renamo had 
insisted upon at Rome, was the first task of the UN demilitarization programme in 
Mozambique. It was decided to bring 7,500 UN peacekeeping troops into the country to 
monitor their dep311ure and take up positions along the transport corridors. The Cease 
Fire Commission (CCF), composed of Mozambican parties, representatives of the 
international and members of ONUMOZ, worked to ensure that peace was maintained in 
the rest of the territory. The terms of the Commission were specific: It was to investigate 
allegations brought to it of violations of the cease-fire agreement signed in Rome. 
39 Alden, C: The UN's Experience of Democratization, Disarmament, and Integration in Southern Africa. p. 
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The demobilization of combatants formed the second part of ONUMOZ's involvement in 
demilitarization. A specialized unit attached to the mission planned and implemented 
demobilization. A team of four UN personnel was assigned to each of the 49 Assembly-
Areas where they were to oversee the process, including the registration of combatants, 
disarmament, the selection of soldiers for the new army and formal demobilization. The 
last short-term component of demilitarization was the creation of a new national army. It 
was initially envisaged that the new army could consist of 30,000 soldiers, equally 
divided between former Government and former Renamo troops and trained by the 
British, French and Portuguese.43 
The long-term component of demilitarization, namely the Information Referral Service 
(IRS) and the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), fell under the auspices of the United 
Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC). These latter 
measures were to be integrated into the actions taken by the Commission of Reintegration 
(CORE), the institution established by the Rome Agreement to direct the process of 
reintegrating soldiers and refugees into the civilian life. The IRS was conceived as a 
mechanism for providing demobilized soldiers with access to information on the job 
market as well as basic information on aspect of the reintegration programme.44 
The initial step in implementing the demilitarization programme was to bring in the UN-
peacekeeping forces to monitor the withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian troops. 
Despite delays that held up their introduction until August 1993, a total of 6,000 
peacekeepers were finally put into place. Concurrent with the introduction of UN troops 
was the monitoring of the cease-fire between the Government and Renamo by the 
CCF.45The next phase of demilitarization, the demobilization of Government and 
Renamo troops, proved to be exceedingly problematic. After negotiations between the SR 
and the two sides, the remaining 14 assembly areas were opened and became operational 
on 21 February 1994. The process then moved ahead. By mid-April 1994, more than 
43 Ibid. p. 13 
44 Ibid. p. 14 











49,000 soldiers had reported to assembly areas for cantonment, of which some 34,000 
were from the Government and more, 14,000 were from Renamo.46 
On 5 May 1994, the Security Council adopted a resolution in which it urged the parties to 
meet the target dates of 1 June for completion of the assembly of forces and 15 July for 
the end of demobilization. But on 15 August, all assembly areas were officially closed to 
new entrants, and the 3,723 troops remaining at the assembly points on that day were 
quickly demobilized or recruited into the reconstituted Mozambican Defence Force. By 
late November 1994, demobilization accounted a total of 57,540 Government and 20,538 
Renamo soldiers, a total of 78, 078. These had been drawn from a total of 91,691 
registered.47 
Demobilization, reintegration of former combatants and humanitarian assistance in both 
countries was slow to begin and, once under way, fraught with risks and danger, but it 
was ultimately successful. This reduced the potential for electoral losers to use unhappy 
and unemployed ex-combatants to destabilize the post-election period. 
46 Th~J.lnitedNations and Mozambiglle 1992-199~. p. 40 











CHAPTER TWO: THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
This chapter will explore the involvement of UNT AG and ONUMOZ in assisting and 
supervising the pre- electoral process, and the elections at its different stages. The chapter 
will then consider the criteria and values which infonn how these bodies function as well 
as the various measures which have been adopted to promote fair conduct. 
2.1 REGISTRATION OF VOTERS 
In Namibia, the draft Registration of Voter Proclamation by the Administrator General 
was published on 24th April 1989 and opened to public comment. Taking these comments 
into account, the Administrator General and UN Special Representative negotiated the 
text of the Proclamation which was promulgated on 30th June 1989. The principal 
registration issue was whether individuals not born in Namibia but who had lived there 
for time would be allowed to register and vote. SW APO was concerned that many whites 
whose only connection with the territory was that they been assigned to it by the South 
African administration would vote and distort the outcome. 48 
The compromise reached was that four years of "ordinary" residence before registration 
was required and that those who had entered Namibia as South African government 
servants had to submit a confirmed statement that they intended to remain in the country 
after independence.49 The voting right of second-generation refugees was assured by 
providing an unconditional right for all person born in Namibia and their children to 
register (this also included those born within the territory to parents in South African 
government service). 50 
48 Cliffe, L: The Transition to Independence in Namibia. p. 117 
49 Hearn, Roger, G: The Effectiveness of the UNTAG Operation in Namibia. p. 226 











Without too much controversy, the legal age for voting was set at 18. Original set from 3 
July to 16 September 1989, the registration period was extended to 23 September at the 
request of Special Representative. A total of701,482 voters were registered.51 
While this may show the success of the process, other factors could have played a part in 
this higher than expected figure. Most significant was the registration of people living 
outside Namibia. This included around 10,000 people living in South Africa, who were 
encouraged to travel by bus to the border with Namibia and register. A large number of 
people in Angola and Zambia also registered to vote. While there were criticisms by 
SW APO that these people were often brought into vote for the DTA, the real benefits 
went to SW APO, which managed to capture most of these included votes from Angola 
and Zambia. Other issues were raised regarding problems with the registration process. 
These including the difficulties experienced by residents of Walvis Bay, who were not 
allowed to register within this territory which South Africa still saw as a part of its 
bl ' 52 repu IC. 
In Mozambique, ONUMOZ played a crucial role in coping with the logistical problems 
of the voter registration process. However, not all problems could be resolved, which had 
negative repercussions on the registration of voters and on monitoring the process in 
difficult access areas, particularly in central Mozambique, Renamo' s stronghold. 
ONUMOZ performed three tasks in the subject area of voter registration: technical 
assistance, provision of security for registration teams, and monitoring and verification. 53 
The first function, technical assistance, was performed by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). The most important technical assistance was 
transport. After the CNE had established 1600 registration brigade, the UNDP helped to 
carry them to all parts of the country, and provided them with camping equipment and 
food. 
51 Harlech-lones, B: A New Thing'? The Namibia Independeni::~Process 1989-1990. p. 158 











The second function, provision of security for the registration teams was performed by 
the UNCIVPOL contingent. It was added to ONUMOZ's functions because registration 
teams were hesitant to enter Renamo areas without protection. The third function, 
monitoring and verification, was performed by 148 officers of ONUMOZ's electoral 
division who were stationed through the country and carried out investigations 
independently from the CNE. 54 
The registration process started well in the north and in the south of the country, but was 
initially very slow in the difficult access areas of central Mozambique. By providing 
security for the registration teams, UNCIVPOL succeeded in speeding up voter 
registration in Renamo territories to a considerable degree. Logistical difficulties to enter 
difficult access areas in central Mozambique, however, could never be completely 
overcome. The only practical means to reach these areas were helicopters, and 
maintaining supplies for the registration teams was a constant logistical challenge. Due to 
these difficulties, some Renamo areas remained excluded from voter registration during 
the entire proeess.55 
The estimated number of eligible voter in Mozambique was 7,850,850. On 15 August, the 
envisaged last day of registration, 5,636,000 voters had been registered. Due to the 
problems of getting into Renamo areas, and the high number of demobilized soldiers and 
refugees returning to their home areas, registration remained incomplete. Therefore, the 
National Assembly twice decided to extend the registration process. By 20 August 1994, 
6,034,066 voters had been registered. By 2 September, the final deadline, 6,363,311 had 
been registered. Although only 81 per cent of the estimated number of eligible voters had 
registered, the process was regarded as complete. Registration brigades worked with 
integrity and dedication to ensure that all those who wanted to register and could do so in 
53 Turner, Michael, 1. Nelson, S. Kimberly Mahling, C: Mozambique's Voter for Democratic Governance. 
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a free and open atmosphere. Staff generally followed the rules, ensuring the fairness of 
the registration process. 56 
2.2 SUMMARY 
In both states, UNTAG and ONUMOZ played an important role in overcoming socio-
political problems that related to the registration of voters, however certain aspects that 
related to the registration process were raised. The following line highlights the similar 
problem of ineffectiveness and effectiveness of UNT AG and ONUMOZ in the 
registration of voters: 
In Namibia, the issue of Walvis Bay, which remained South African territory, regarding 
the right to register based on birth or residence was solved by tacit agreement. Whilst no 
registration took place within the enclave, persons claiming the right to register could do 
so in any town in Namibia. 57 
In Mozambique, the country was still physically divided between Frelimo and Renamo 
affiliations. Voter registration was disadvantageous to Renamo. It was in the difficult 
access areas of central Mozambique, Renamo's stronghold, (Sofala and Zambezia) where 
voter registration could not completely overcome logistical difficulties. However, 
Renamo did not formally protest against the result of the registration process. Logistical 
difficulties, caused by insufficient resources, also affected the ability of the ONUMOZ to 
monitor and verify the process. 58 
Some cases of human rights abuse occurred during the registration period, in both 
countries. In Namibia, most reported cases of intimidation were in the Owambo-
dominated north where ex-Koevoet members, often wearing DTA colours or hired as 
DTA party organizers, continued to terrorize and intimidate SW APO supporters. Koevoet 
56 Ibid. p. 9 
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elements in SWAPOL did continue to engage in what amounted to counterinsurgency 
operations, teams taking off in their Casspir vehicles on patrols, presumably of 
surveillance but with intimidatory impact. Another case of intimidation occurred at Osifo 
center of registration near Ruacana, where the Koevoet using Casspirs to block SW APO 
supporters vehicles en route to register. However the assassination of Anton Lubowski, 
the leading white member in SW APO, in September 1989 was the most important case of 
human rights abuse. 59 
In Mozamhique, UNCIPOL had the mandate to independently investigate the 
performance of the PRM (Police of the Republic Of Mozambique) and the Renamo 
Police. Five sets of serious human rights violations were observed: detention of persons 
without legal reason, detention of accused persons for more than the legal period, use of 
excessive force, torture and even killing detainees. These gross human rights violations 
were reported to the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) and UNCIPOL, but 
these commissions persistently failed to take action.6o 
Necessary documentation that a prospective voter should have, (identity document or a 
birth certificate) showing that he/she was born in Namibia or Mozambique was not easy 
for many Namibians and Mozambicans living in the rural areas, where illiteracy was at its 
highest, and where modern communications and transport were least developed. 
Producing a proof was very difficult. At the end of the registration process in Namibia, 
UNT AG concluded that no significant number of eligible voters had been denied access 
to registration. 
In Mozambique, Mozambican migrant workers, returning refugees, and demobilized 
soldiers did not get access to a registration post. As a result, no arrangements could be 
made for registration and voting at Mozambican embassies or through other accredited 
channels. This effectively excluded the entire category of male migrant workers in South 
59 Cliffe, L: The Transition to Independence in Namibia. p. 125 











Africa and other neigbouring countries. In this context ONUMOZ did not attempt to 
resolve these issues as they arose. 61 
2.3 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
An electoral system refers to a method that a given country adopts for choosing national 
leaders. It encompasses administrative, procedural and institutional mechanisms that 
govern election process. In Mozambique and Namibia, the constitutions and electoral 
laws defined procedures, rules and regulations governing elections.62In Namibia, one 
election was held and SW APO and South Africa only accepted the proportional 
representation electoral system. In Mozambique, all political parties agreed also with 
proportional representation. The systems of prop0l1ional representation are designed to 
produce elected assemblies in which the share of the popular vote received by each 
competing party is reflected in the share of the seats won by that party in the assembly.63 
In Mozambique two elections were held, presidential and parliamentary elections. For the 
presidential elections the system was: Absolute Majority (or "first past the post). The 
candidate who receives more than half of the validly cast votes is elected. If no candidate 
obtains the absolute a majority of votes, a second ballot will be held (between the 7th and 
21 5t day after the publication of the results of the first ballot), in which only the 
candidates with the highest number of votes compete. In the run-off election, the 
candidate with the majority of votes is elected.64 
2.4 SUMMARY 
In Namibia, election to the Assembly would be on the basis of proportional 
representation, with seventy-two seats to be filled. These seats would be allocated to 
61 Martinho, C, Malan, M: Anomalies and Acquiescence: The Mozambican Peace Process Revisited. In: 
7 No 4, 1998. p.4 
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parties by dividing the total number of votes cast by seventy-two to determine the quota 
for one candidate. In Mozambique, for the presidential election, the candidate with 
majority of votes is elected. For the National Assembly election, the electoral system 
adopted was that of proportional representation through party lists, and votes were 
converted into parliamentary seats through the Hondt method. At stake in the election of 
the Assembly of the Republic were 250 seats in single chamber. The distribution of seats 
contested in each provincial constituency was determined not by the population density 
of each province, but by the number of voters who registered there. 
2.5 REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
As it had already been agreed that there would be a system of proportional representation 
for Namibia's independence elections, a list of political parties had to be producc:d prior 
to the election. The Administrator General and Special Representative negotiated the text 
of the registration of political organizations proclamation and the agreement on related 
procedures, which were published in September 1989. The principal issue regarded the 
requirement that each party applying to register would have to deposit R 10,000, which 
would be returned to any party winning at least one seat in the Constituent Assembly, and 
nominations signed by two thousand registered voters who supported the party's 
application to be registered.65 
Ten parties and alliances, registered for the election of November 1989, four (apart from 
the DT A), were fronts or alliances. In addition to SW APO a further three parties which 
had existed for some time also registered: Action Christian National, the election front of 
the National Party. CAN was founded in 1989, but the National Party (SWA) was 
founded in 1924.65 Christian Democratic Action (CDA) founded in 1982 and led by Peter 
Kalangula, a chairman of the executive committee of the Ovambo Legislative Assembly 
(1982-89). From 1980 to 1982, Kalangula was president of the DT A. SW APO-
Democratic (SW APO-D), founded in 1978 by former SW APO member, and led by 











Andreas Shipanga, a founder member of SWAPO. In addition to these longer-established 
parties, the Namibia National Democratic Party (NNDP), founded in 1989, also 
registered for the election. Proclamation AG 49 of 13 October, stated that each party or 
alliance should provide the chief electoral officer with a list of at least twenty-four 
candidates, arranged in order of preference for appointment to the Constituent 
Assembly.66 
In Mozambique, time for the presentation of candidatures, the CNE decided to set up an 
ad hoc committee, charged with receiving and registering nomination papers and 
organizing them for eventual analysis. The committee, chaired by Commissioner Manuel 
Frank, subdivided into two sub-committees, one each for presidential and legislative 
candidatures, each composed of three CNE members and one STAB official. The ad hoc 
committee established a system of shifts, involving all CNE members and some STAE 
officials, which pennitted round-the-clock work on the reception, registration and 
organization of nomination papers. In that way, candidates were infonned of whatever 
irregularities were discovered in their documentation and given the five-day statutory 
deadline to correct the anomalies. 
In a CNE communique on the nominations process (containing infonnation on deadlines 
and procedures to follow), a provisional distribution of parliamentary seats was provided, 
pending the conclusion of voter registration, to enable parties and alliances to propose 
appropriate numbers of candidates in their list. Despite the fact that relevant deadlines are 
clearly stipulated in the Electoral Law and that the CNE communique further highlighted 
the admissible period for the presentation of candidatures, most parties and candidates 
submitted their nomination papers at the very end of the period, thus creating a pile-up of 
work for the CNE. 67 
Nomination for the office of president, was reserved for every citizen with original 
nationality, aged 35 years or over who is duly registered as voter, is eligible for the office 
66 Ibid. p: 167 











of President of the Republic, exceptions: Citizens who have been affected by any of the 
common incapacities (e.g. having been sentenced to imprisonment for certain crimes etc.) 
and who have not resided ordinarily in the national territory for at least six months prior 
to the elections date are not eligible. The legally constituted political parties and 
coalitions of parties with the support of at least 10,000 electors may present the 
nominations for the office of President. It may also be presented by groups of electors, 
with a minimum of 10,000 signatures. 
For parliamentary elections, all registered Mozambican citizens (who have not been 
affected by common incapacities) were eligible to stand for the Assembly of the republic, 
with a few exceptions: magistrates of the judicimy or the department of Public 
Prosecution, professional army and militarized personnel and career diplomats were not 
eligible if they are still on active duty. The mandate of Deputy was incompatible with the 
functions of member of government and with paid employment by foreign states or 
. . I .. 68 mternatlOna orgamzatlOns. 
By 1 September 1994, the day before the deadline for the submission of presidential 
nomination papers, only three candidatures had been presented. The remaining ten came 
in on the last day. The first party lists for the legislative elections started coming in the 
afternoon of September 2, less than an hour from the deadline, which meant that 
reception of papers continued until 2:30 a.m. 69 
Among the thil1een nominations submitted, the CNE rejected the proposed candidature of 
Neves Pinto Serrano, proposed by PPLM, as it did not meet the conditions stipulated in 
articles 184-186 of the electoral law. The following candidatureshad been registered: 
Maximo Diogo Jose Dias, Carlos Jose Maria Jeque, Casimiro Miguel Nhamithambo, 
Mario Fernando Carlos Machele, Carlos Alexandre dos Reis, Afonso Macacho Marceta 
Dhlakama, Jacob Neves Salomao Sibindy, Padimbe Mahose Kamati Andrea, Domingos 
68 Krennerich, M: Mozambique multi-party elections. In: Elections in Africa. p. 649 
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Antonio Mascarenchas Arouca, Vasco Campira Momboya Alfzema, Wehia Monakacho 
Ripua and Joaquim Alberto Chissano. 
Following the verification of proposed candidatures for the legislative election, the 
following party lists were accepted: AP (Coligacao Alianca Patriotic a), FRELIMO 
(Frente deLibertacao de Mocambique), FUMO/PCD (Frente Unida de Mocambique, and 
Partido de Convergencia Democratico), PACODE (Partido de Congresso Democratico), 
PADEMO (Partido Democratico de Mocambique), PCN (Patido de Convencao National), 
PIMO (Partido Independente de Mocambique), PPPM (Patido de Progresso do Povo de 
Mocambique), PRD (Patido Renovador Democratico), PT (Partido Trabalhista), 
RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana), SOL (Partido Social Liberal e 
Democratico),UNAMO (Uniao Nacional Mocambicana), UD (Uniao Democratico). 70 
2.6 SUMMARY 
In Namibia, ten political parties and alliances have been registered, but it was clear to all 
observers that SW APO and the DT A were the front-runners in the 1989 election. 
Mozambicans had 12 presidential candidates, 14 competing parties and alliances from 
which to choose. These numbers did not, however, represent a flourishing culture of 
political opposition. Before the campaign, the only names familiar to the population were 
those of Joaquim Chissano/Frelimo and Afonso Dhlakamal Renamo. The reasons for the 
multiplicity of parties and candidates are partly historical, dating back to pre-
independence times, but were also linked to the fact that the international community had 
funds available for new political parties. 











2.7 VOTER EDUCATION CAMPAIGN 
Voter education campaigns were aimed at stimulating the citizenry's participation in the 
elections. It was important to establish confidence in the prospects for reclaiming national 
dignity, developing a spirit of tolerance and reconciliation. Hence, the campaign sought 
to promote confidence in the electoral process and in the organs responsible for its 
conduct, their independence from the state and political parties and to create climate 
conductive to informed participation in the process. As a basic component of free and fair 
elections, voter education is ensuring that not only do voters understand how to vote, but 
they also have a broad understanding of their political and civil right. 71 
As a result, voter education not only spreads a message about democratic rights, it also 
seeks to build organizational capacity and train people with new skills. It can also playa 
role in conscientising citizens of the rights of various groups in their country, and the role 
that such groups can play in support of democracy and diversity. Various types of media 
were used throughout the voter education campaign, including printed material, 
television, radio, and theatre. 72 
Clearly, in non-literate society, with limited access to aural and visual media, a major role 
exited for UNTAG and for the different political parties to increase the level of voter 
awareness in Namibia, particularly given the high rate of illiteracy, around 60%. The 
UNT AG acknowledged that the success of operation depended on the acceptance and the 
support of the population in Namibia. The SR described three key phases of the activity. 
Initially, the program focused on an explanation of the Resolution 435, UNTAG's role in 
the transition process, and above all trying to associate UNT AG with free and fair 
elections. Beginning mid July 1989, the program moved to providing an explanation of 
the electoral process including how to register and vote. A Code of conduct was also 
publicized along with a campaign against intimidation and coercion. 73 
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As the operation progressed, UNTAG's voter education program intensified. It pressed 
the South West Africa Broadcast Corporation (SW ABC) radio network to allow it air 
time to make relevant broadcast to familiarize people with democracy concepts. 
Broadcasts were made in 10 different languages. A series of advertisements were also 
placed in local papers, stressing an individual's right to vote for which every party they 
wished and highlighting the privacy of a person's vote. A number of multilingual 
pamphlets, badges and stickers were also produced regarding all aspects of voter 
education. In fact, by the time the UNT AG operation was completed over half a million 
items had been distributed throughout Namibia. 74 
Given Mozambique's high illiteracy rate (67 percent) and the lack of previous experience 
with democratic, multiparty elections, voter education preoccupied the technical 
secretariat and the international community. With assistance from UNDP advisers and the 
American-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Technical secretariat 
conducted a comprehensive voter education program to increase knowledge and build 
trust in the elections. Consequently, voter education campaigns, including those 
conducted by churches and other civil-society organizations, linked elections with peace. 
With the country polarized between Renamo and Frelimo, voter education also 
emphasized that elections would provide choices and that the vote was secret. 75 
Voter education was divided into five phases: namely: promotion of the image of the 
CNE and its organs; mobilization for the electoral process, democracy and civic rights; 
participation in polling; acceptance of the results. The CNE coordinated their diverse 
initiatives, in conformity with the law, and to avoid duplication of the efforts and 
confusion among the populace. Various types of media were used throughout the country. 
The subjects covered were, respectively, voter registration, eivic rights, and voting; 
cartoons strips, with the central theme "everyone has to participate". Some of the 
74 Ibid. p. 233 
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materials did not match the quality expected, and the contractors delivered some, well 
after the agreed dates. Nevertheless, they widely distributed through schools, work 
places, and at important junctures, such as 21 October, which was declared as the 
National Civic Education day. The impact of this massive civic education effort can, 
perhaps best be measured by the massive voter turnout on polling days. 76 
2.8 SUMMARY 
The voter education campaign was the largest and most concentrated act of social 
communication in Namibian and Mozambican history, and it was carried out over an 
extremely short space of time. UNTAG and ONUMOZ tried to bring in both countries 
the most correct and objective information possible as to what the elections would be. 
Most of the material was in print form or can'ied on radio and television. Little was likely 
to reach the illiterate rural masses. While the primary responsibility for voter education 
might seem to rest with the political parties, their efforts varied greatly. 
In Namibia, during the period of voter education the party such as the OT A. assisted by 
the South West African Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC), and the newspapers that 
opposed SW APO, had portrayed UNT AG as an organization that favoured the cause of 
SW APO. The SW ABC never broadcast a statement issued by SW APO. Nor had any 
SW APO official, or supporter speaking for the organization, ever appeared on, or been 
interviewed on, the SW ABC. Only attacks and commentaries on SW APO were 
broadcast, without the right of reply being granted to the organization. Thus, the SW ABC 
and the news papers did not play an important role in terms of voter education. For many 
Namibians who relied on the SW ABC and the OTA-controlled newspapers, the image of 
SWAPO was one whicb was created and manipulated entirely by these sources. 77 
But given the scarcity of these media forms, UNTAG personnel initiated a series of 
communications through churches, community leaders (such as headmen or schools) and 
76 Ibid. p. 160 











the different political parties. Namibia has an extremely high rate of church attendance. In 
the northern areas of the country, where television was almost unheard and radios were 
few and far between, the church was the most important forum of discussion and 
education. In isolated communities, the church is often the only area where members of 
the public gather in a large number. UNT AG personnel used the church as means of 
communication. There was really good cooperation and coordination between the church 
and UNTAG. UNTAG was successful because of the involvement of the church in the 
electoral procedures. 78 
In Mozambique, Radio Mozambique (RM) historically had been a government station, 
loyal to the Frelimo party and critical of Renamo. During the period of voter education, 
RM did not provide the Mozambican with important infornlation concerning voter 
education. This bias carried over into the early part of the campaign, when RM broadcast 
more news about Frelimo than Renamo and the minor parties.79 Bias in RM programming 
contributed to Afonso Dhlakama' s belief that Renamo needed its own station. Renamo' s 
radio station was forthcoming in 1994 from the Gennan Foreign Ministry. Unable during 
the voter education campaign to tum their own radio station into anything other than a 
propaganda tool for their party, filling its air time with little other than denunciations 
against Frelimo and long interviews with Afonso Dhlakama.8o The serious lack of civic 
education meant that voters as well as political pal1ies were confused; some Renamo 
areas remained excluded from voter education during the entire process. However 
Renamo did not fonnally protest or initiate its own educational campaign. 
The CNE during the period of voter education placed an obligation of neutrality on those 
people doing civic education (voter education agents). They needed to stress the right of 
the voter to choose between the qualities and programmes of the competitors without 
indicating their own personal position. However this neutrality had complex implication 
78 Hearn George. R: The Effectiveness of the UNTAG Operation to Namibia. p. 234 











in terms of Mozambique's recent history of conflict. Despite their formal autonomy from 
the party, they often continued to be regarded as identified with Fre1imo or Renamo. 
During the campaign there were several incidents pitting voter education agents against 
people who knew nothing about the CNE's activities. In some cases the agents were tied 
up and beaten because they were believed to represent the other party. This was because 
during simulated voting exercises, they would wear T-shirts with the insignia of "Frelimo 
party or Renamo party," to illustrate the role of monitors at the polling station. Since they 
were in zones under the strong influence of a particular party, they were beaten. When 
they finally managed to explain that they were from the CNE, and the function they were 
playing, they had already received a good thrashing.81 
The Technical Secretariat for election administration did not really play its role in terms 
of voter education. The secretariat was far more politicized; it also suffered from a lack of 
professional experience, poor management, and frequent absences. This lack of 
institutional capacity created many avoidable problems, including strikes by electoral 
workers and voter education agents for back pay. These factors reduced the election 
machineries ability to function properly, 82 
81 Juarez de Maria, G: Civic education in the Mozambican elections. In: Mozambique Election Democracy 
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CHAPTER THREE: CAMPAIGNING AND VOTING 
3.1 CAMPAIGNING 
Few weeks of elections campaigning allowed voters to hear politicians defend their 
records, criticize those of their opponents and propose policies for the future. A campaign 
opens the pores of a political system and an election provides the parties with the 
electorate's verdict on the past and preferences for the future. In the event, the campaign 
presented two modes which can be distinguished as: the "official" comprising published 
policy documents, prepared statements and advertisements in the press, radio and 
television, and the" popular" covering the actual contact with the electorate in meetings 
and through word of mouth.83 
In Namibia, the campaign had started informally; it intensified with the registration of 
political parties. UNTAG's task was to provide a level playing field, ensure that 
government action did not favour or prejudice any party, and that the interaction of 
parties would not lead to behaviour jeopardizing a peaceful and informative campaign. A 
Code of conduct prohibiting violence and unfair election practices was signed by all 
parties and, although not legally enforceable, contributed greatly to creating an 
atmosphere in which free and fair elections could be held. 84 
In Mozambique, the electoral law laid down the obligation to conduct the campaign 
ethically, forbidding "appeals to disorder or insurrection, or incitements to hatred, 
violence or war". The electoral law had envisaged a campaign period of 45 days, but 
delays in previous procedures led to this being shortened, beginning on 22 September and 
ending two days before the election. Of course, the parties had already been stating their 
positions prior to this to this date but from then, a range of conditions came into 
operation: principally freedom of expression and information, freedom of assembly and 
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demonstration, equal opportunities for all candidates in terms of access to the radio and 
television85 
It is also important to note that SW APO, DT A, Frelimo and Renamo were the main 
political parties in Namibia and Mozambique during the first multi-party elections. In this 
case, most attention will be given to the policies and manifestos, which were presented by 
DTA, SW APO, Renamo and Frelimo during the election campaign because these parties 
were always the acknowledged forerunners in the election. Between them, they gained 
sixty- two of the seventy-two seats in the Constituent Assembly, and 241 parliamentary 
seats in the National Assembly. 
In general political campaigning in Namibia and Mozambique was a colourful business. 
All the registered parties produced T-shirts in party colours and flags that were flown 
from rooftops and from trees, so some supporters even had special outfits in party colours 
for wearing to rallies and political occasions. 
This section compares SW APO and Frelimo on the one hand and DT A and Renamo on 
the other. One major emphasis in SWAPO's campaign strategy, as in Frelimo's, was to 
promote major rallies featuring national leaders, mobilizing mass attendance from locals, 
and bringing in supporters from afar. At this first rally Nujoma stated the theme of 
"Reconciliation", which was to be such a main plank throughout SW APO's political 
campaigning, urging white N amibians not to leave the country and stating clearly that 
"SW APO has no intention of imposing one-party political system against the will of the 
people" 86 
Frelimo's rallies were planned well in advance with the help of a Brazilian public 
relations company and other foreign advisors. At different rallies Chissano, leader of 
Frelimo presented himself as the man who achieved a peace accord to end the war with 
Renamo. He ridiculed Renamo's claim to have forced him into democracy. Again 
Chissano said that the real cause of economie problems was not mismanagement but that 
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Renamo had destroyed the local sugar mill and other industries. Renamo destruction had 
prevented Frelimo to develop the country, he said 87 
Nujoma's speech about "Reconciliation" was amongst the most public and frequently 
repeated themes during the SW APO election campaign. It was aimed in the first place to 
whites, who were assured that SW APO had fought against a system, not individuals, and 
that whites should not leave Namibia but remain to help build the new nation and 
country. The policy about reconciliation was regarded as imperative in view of the 
polarization imposed on the Namibian people by the apartheid government. Distrust, 
suspicion, and fear were some of the ugly features of Namibian society. Communities 
have been set against each other; tribe against tribe, race against race, etc ... The 
SWAPO's policy of national reconciliation was aimed, therefore, at healing these wounds 
of Namibia. 88 
National reconciliation was not a moral ideal, but also a practical matter, as Nujoma 
implied \\!hen he addressed a meeting in Ovambo on 7 October 1989. With strong 
antipathies existing towards the police and ex-Koevoet members, entailing potential for 
conflict and disturbance of public order, Nujoma addressed himself directly to these 
people. Koevoet members were invited to join SWAPO and help build up Namibia. He 
stated: The police were referred to a~ 'no longer the enemies of the Namibian people' but 
rather as 'our own Namibian police for the future' .89 
SW APO and Frelimo promised reconciliation, reconstruction, renewal, changes in health, 
education, and the economy to right the wrongs of the past and bring about a fair 
distribution of resources and facilities. Frelimo references to the tenn "Reconciliation" in 
the campaign speeches of official spokespersons seem less common than more general 
appeals for peace andjustice.9o Given Namibia's high level of illiteracy, SW APO's policy 
about education was ambiguous; Nujoma made a lot of criticisms about "Bantu 
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education", which was imposed on the Namibian people by the apartheid government, 
but he did not provide any explanation concerning the transformation of the current 
school structures and educational contents, and create a democratic education, favouring 
equality of opportunities for all citizens to participate in the economic, civic and cultural 
life of the country 91 
Frelimo, m its programme for government presented to the Mozambican electorate, 
declared that education is a fundamental right of every citizen, and it's the central 
instrument for improving living conditions and for raising the technical and scientific 
level of the workers. It also stated that education is the basic means for acquiring the 
knowledge needed for understanding and intervention in the tasks of national 
development, in the struggle for peace, natiom1 reconciliation and solidarity.92 
The DTA began the election campaign of 1989 with the decided disadvantage of being 
blamed for the many deficiencies and inequalities that exi.sted in Namibia. DTA's central 
message seemed to be to project an image of a patron sufficiently experience in 
government and with enough access to resources to be trusted with people's security and 
welfare.93 One of Renamo's strongest campaigning points, particularly emphasized by 
Dhlakama, was that Renamo had fought and won not just for democracy but for the rights 
of northern majority ethnic groups such as the Macua of Nampula province not to be 
exploited by the southerners, who dominated Frelimo.94 Renamo and the DTA's main 
planks were to denigrate Frelimo and SW APO rather than to present any alternative plat 
form. 
In general, the DTA directed its political attacks at the following features: SWAPO's 
proclivities for socialism, which was portrayed as a failed and ruinous system; the human 
rights record of SW APO, most especially the detainee issue, to present SW APO as an 
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organization with no respect of human rights; SW APO's "undemocratic record" not only 
in respect of atrocities against its own members, but also the failure of the organization to 
hold a party congress for over twenty years, and its ambiguity on multi-party democracy. 
The SW APO leadership was portrayed as living in luxury abroad, ignorant of the actual 
conditions in Namibia, while their followers languished in refugee camps or were 
betrayed by unfulfilled promises of educational and training opportunities. 95 
Renamo attacked Southern domination and promised a better sharing of power among 
ethnic groups, which it mentioned by name. Specifically, in his speeches, Dhlakama 
never talked about "Mozambicans" but always called people in the bush by their ethnic 
designation. He said Frelimo's bad policie~ and misgovernment were responsible for 
nation's ills. The Renamo leader during the e!ections campaigns made a number of 
claims of fraud and threats to withdraw dUling the campaign and promised to paralyze the 
country in less than 24 hours. Possible action was spelled out by "imparcial", a Maputo 
daily newsletter considered very close to Renamo. 96 
Speaking about education, Renamo presented a programme to the Mozambican electorate 
with the following characteristics: to eradicate illiteracy, by encouraging the creation of 
night schools, to introduce curriculum reforms, incorporating concepts of democracy into 
the teaching programmes, and to correct the existing distortions and imbalance 
particularly bet\veen the middle and higher levels.97 The above were some of the charges 
aimed at SW APO and Frelimo by DT A and Renamo politicians during the elections 
campaign. Attacks, accusations, and insinuations against SW APO and Frelimo comprised 
the substantial portion of DT A and Renamo' s election platforms. 
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In a non-literate society like Namibia and Mozambique, the impact of the printed word 
during the electoral campaign was obviously limited. The newspapers (daily and weekly) 
were concentrated in the urban areas. However, the arrival of the multi-party system 
found Mozambican and Namibian print journalists, without the necessary training and 
experience to cany out independent, critical coverage of the electoral campaign so that 
the overall level of reporting was low. The national press has always shown a strong 
urban bias. Journalists related more to the urban and peri-urban context which represented 
a "modern" view of Mozambique and Namibia rather than the less accessible rural areas. 
The principal means used by all parties in the "popuiar" campaign was to hold public 
meetings. These meetings addressed by the presidential candidates attracted the 
audiences. Generally, the practice in meetings was to present the candidates in terms of 
the big man who could take on the problems of his dependents and solve them, rather 
than the mandated representatives of a political party. The broad electorate was not much 
interested in economic policy, although a majority of Mozambicans and N amibians being 
poor, unemployed or underemployed, and undereducated or illiterate, the campaigns were 
very much interested in promises of improvement in material circumstances and 
economic opportunities. 
All parties promised large scale improvement and investment in health and education, 
without acknowledging the constraint on public spending which the World Bank and IMF 
would demand to any new government. Statements on education were equally grandiose 
and unrealistic. 
In Mozambique, the electoral campaign was overwhelmingly peaceful; there was 
nevertheless a level of intolerance of the opposition being showed particularly, but not 
only, by Frelimo.98 In Namibia, the election campaign was marred by incidents of 
violence and intimidation. But most cases of intimidation were in the Ovambo-dominated 











north against SW APOL and especially Koevoet. There were also allegations that the 
DTA members and ex-Koevoet would often work together in acts of intimidation and 
brutalization of SW APO supporters. This situation was exacerbated by UNT AG' s 
inability to act against and investigate these incidents.99 
3.3 VOTING 
In Namibia, in accordance with UNSCR 435 an election for the Constituent Assembly 
was held from 7 to 11 November 1989. This was just over seven months after the 
implementation of 435 on 1 April 1989. Ten parties/ alliances contested the election, with 
SW APO and the DTA as the acknowledged front-runners. 
Since the disastrous events of April that year, significant changes were made in relation 
to UNTAG. The original CIVPOL component of 360 had been increased to 1000 by 
August 1989, as a result of the realization by the UN that it needed to significantly 
increase its 'electoral presence' during the crucial election period. 100 There was also a 
huge influx of international observer missions to aid UNTAG during the elections. This 
resulted in dramatic improvement in stability with few reported incidents of intimidation 
or violence in the last month before the elections. 101 Thus UNTAG had finally succeeded, 
at least in the latter stages of the electoral process, in establishing a climate for free and 
fair elections. The election it self went by with little or no incidents. 
Counting commenced on l3 November at 23 different locations and the final results were 
available on 14 November 1989.97 % of the 701 483 registered voters had cast their vote 
and only 1.4 % of ballots were declared invalid. SWAPO won 57.3% of the total vote and 
was the leading or second party in 15 out of the 25 electoral districts. In Ovamboland, 
SW APO won 92%, whilst in the rest of the country it won 48%.102 These results clearly 
confirmed the extent of SW APO support within the country. The remarkably high turnout 
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and the SW APO majority, although it failed to gain the two- thirds majority, seemed to 
have silenced the critics of UNTAG and 435 in terms of the free and fairness of the 
elections. Ahtisaari indeed proclaimed them free and fair. 103 
In Mozambique, the month before the elections, tensions mounted. Electoral workers 
threatened to strike over salaries. The Renamo candidate, Dhlakama, accused Frelimo of 
planning massive electoral fraud. He announced he would not accept the results if he lost 
several key provinces. The Association of Demobilized Soldiers threatened to disrupt the 
elections unless they received money. The police demanded extra pay for guarding the 
polling sites and ballot boxes. Private security services proliferated. Directly violating the 
peace agreement, the government transferred a significant amount of arms and men from 
the military to the police. All these issues raised concerns of an Angolan-style end to the 
electoral process. To keep the process from deteriorating further, the lTN secretary 
general announced that the essential conditions for the hoiding of fi'ee and fair elections 
had been met. The Security Council said it would endorse the results if lJNOMOZ 
declared the elections free and fair. This was supported by a communique from a summit 
meeting of the leaders of the former so-called Fromline States. 104 
On the first day of the election, voters atTived at the designated polling stations from 
dawn onwards. Most were not aware that Renamo had in fact withdrawn from the 
election, alleging that the "minimum conditions for the realization of free and fair 
elections" had not been created. In the event, voting went on through the country, because 
the notoriously poor nature of Mozambique's communications actually helped. It 
prevented most voters from knowing about Renamo's action. 105Most dramatically, the 
boycott had no visible effect on voters. Except in the few areas tightly controlled by 
Renamo. 106 Finally on Friday morning Renamo agreed to tell its party monitors to return, 
Dhlakama went on the radio to announce Renamo' s return to the election (and to use the 
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live broadcast to urge people to vote for him, in violation of a ban on campaigning during 
the voting period). 
By 31 October, ONUMOZ was able to declare the polling successful. It noted some 87% 
of the registered voters had cast their ballots. On November, the Special Representative 
issued a preliminary statement asserting that Mozambique's first multi-party elections 
had been conducted peacefully, in a well-organized manner and without any major 
irregularities or incidents. He added that United Nations observation did not report any 
claim of fraud or intimidation, or any pattern of incidents that could affect the credibility 
of the elections. He promised to make an official pronouncement regarding the freedom 
and fairness of the entire electoral process following the completion of the count. to? 
When the results were finally declared on 18 November 1994. they showed that in the 
presidential election 87.8% of the registered electorate voted. 5.7% of the ballots cast 
were blank, and 2.76% were invalid. In parliamentary elections, 87.8% of the registered 
electorate voted: 8.46% of these votes were blank and 3.2% were invalid. Declaring the 
election results, the CNE Chairman Brazao Mazula said that Joaquim Chissano had 
received 53.30% of the votes in the presidential election, while Afonso Dhlakama had 
received 33.73%. In the legislative election, Frelimo won 44.33% of the votes, giving it 
129 seats, while Renamo received 37.78%, giving it 112 scats. 
The three-party coalition, UD, received 5.15% of the votes, entitling it to nine seats in the 
Assembly. On 19 November, in Maputo, the Special representative welcomed the results 
with a formal declaration that the elections had been free and fair. 103 He said that 
although problems had occurred, no event or series of events could affect the overall 
credibility of the elections. Both the OAU and the European Union also declared the 
elections to be free and fair. The observation mission of the European Union, which, with 
its member States, defrayed about 805 of the coasts of the elections, expressed 
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satisfaction that the results announced were correct and reflected the true outcome of the 
ballot. 108 
3.4 SUMMARY 
Ultimately the United Nations role in the elections process was successful. UNTAG and 
UNOMOZ's most notable success, to which the many other observers contributed, was to 
ensure that the actual casting of votes went ahead with only minor infringements and 
complaints and was substantially fair in the sense of allowing no significant distortion. 
This achievement owed much to the large number and experience of the election 
supervisors. Most voters understood not only how to cast a ballot, but also the political 
dynamics between the political parties. They voted according to what they perceived to 
be their best interests. 109 
In Namibia, UNT AG' s role in the election process was successful, because it succeeded 
to handle the disbandment of the Koevoet and some of the ethnic battalions. This reduced 
the level of intimidation and the majority of people felt comfortable to vote. From the 
small number of spoilt vote it could be assumed that people understood how to vote and 
that the voting procedure was not excessively confusing, thus to a successful campaign of 
voter education on the part of UNT AG and the different political parties. The techniques 
used by UNTAG to inform the population about different aspects of the electoral process, 
appeared to be effective in this regard. UNTAG's Information Program played a critical 
role in educating the population about UNT AG' s role, the elections and the transition to 
independence. This was especially important given the bias and misinformation 
emanating from the SW ABC. 110 
However, the negative factors that featured in this part of the UNT AG operation needed 
to be raised. The Special Representative was criticized for not tackling the Administrator 
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General in more confrontational manner. Some even raised the intervention of the UN 
Secretary General as a display of impatience at the Special Representative for not 
bringing about changes to the electoral laws. In the end the Special Representative's 
approach was based on the fact that he had to agree or to negotiate steadily reforms. 
Hence the SP had considerable power over the AG; this could be enhanced further by 
direct contact with the South Africans or with pressure from the Security CounciL A 
problem with this approach was that the reforms occurred, in the case of the electoral 
laws, only three weeks before the elections. III 
In Mozambique, ONUMOZ and other International organizations managed to transform 
Renamo from a politico-military group to a political party capable of undertaking a 
national electoral campaign and serving in the assembly. This transformation was a key 
to the success of the peace process. 112 
The UN Special Representative in Mozambique, Aldo-Ajello stated that the success of 
ONUMOZ was due to the will of the people to end a war which had been characterized 
by a strong violence against the people. The population was the weakest party in the 
conflict. Civil society was undermined to the extent where it was unable to undertake 
actions with considerable impact on the course of the war. Tired of dying, the maiming, 
and the other deprivations of war, the people were prepared to accept anything, provided 
it would be an alternative to violence, economic decline, destruction of the social fabric, 
and the fear of going back to war led the civil population to take reconciliation measures 
even before the cease fire was in place. 
It was not surprising, therefore, that the people of Mozambique generally responded far 
more favourably than the government to the ONUMOZ presence in their country. 
ONUMOZ proved to be more than simply a symbol of the silencing of the guns. It 
facilitated the reunification of thousands of formerly separated families. The 
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humanitarian assistance component of the mission went beyond conventional emergency 
relief activities, by also providing support for, among others agricultural production, road 
rehabilitation, water supply, health and education. By mid-1994, ONUMOZ had assisted 
in resurrecting or establishing 750 primary schools, 250 health centres and 200 wells. 
The people of Mozambique had lost all trust in the warring parties' capacity to provide 
for their future well-being and to provide resources for their basic immediate needs. 
Demobilized soldiers from both parties, and displaced people from different political 
affiliations, all came together to receive aid with a unifying identity: that of the needy, the 
deprived, and the hungry. He also recognized that the electoral process was marred by 
procedural problems, most caused by logistical difficulties or lack of training, but found 
no major irregularities that would have affected the outcome of the vote. 113 
In analyzing the range of civic education activities during the Namibian and Mozambican 
elections, we can conclude that the participation of the public was conscious and that they 
understood the real value of their role in the process. But in terms of ballots cast which 
were declared invalid or blank, we can note that the Namibian population did understand 
very well the electoral process much more than the Mozambican people. 
3.5 ELECTION OUTCOME 
In Namibia, the first multi-party election under lJNT AG marked the end of the long 
liberation struggle (105 years of colonial rule) and the implementation of Resolution 435. 
By achieving the peaceful solution of the Namibia dispute, the United Nations enhanced 
its own reputation as a world organization and a champion for world peace. Moreover, it 
finnly established its role as the defender of the rights of self-determination for peoples 
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and territories under foreign and colonial rule. However, it was clear that a measure of 
'etlmic' loyalty was reflected in the results of the ballot. 114 
SWAPO's strength was overwhelmingly in Ovamboland, which alone contributed 57.8 
percent of its vote and where its appeal successfully reached all areas, social strata, and 
classes. Kavango was another area of large support, where SW APO got more than 50 
percent. SW APO also got majority support in centers of organized labor, the mines, and 
the major towns. A large proportion of Owambo-speakers voted for SWAPO, but 
SW APO's victory at the polls could not be exclusively ascribed to this factor. 115 
An argument was made that SW APO was the vanguard of the liberation struggle during 
the period 1961-1989. This role was recognized internationally as well as by the majority 
of Namibians, particularly the Owambos, who bore the brunt of South Africa military 
power and made most sacrifices during the aforesaid period. The international solidarity 
behind SW APO amongst member of the General Assembly of the UN; its recognition by 
the latter as the "authentic representative of the people of Namibia" and having at its 
disposal a trained military force, gave it influence, power and finance which were 
insurmountable obstacles for any Namibian political opponent. I 16 
The Owambo population was the majority ethnic group. The vast majority of Owambo 
voters voted and would continue to vote in the foreseeable future, for a party which is 
regarded as the authentic Owambo palty and for leaders regarded as the authentic 
Owambo leaders. The support of most of the member churches forn1ing the Council of 
Churches, but particularly the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia with Bishop 
Dumeni at its head played a significant part in the SW APO victory. 117 
The DT A had the advantage of at least a decade of being at the helm of the interim 
government or at least sharing in it with South Africa. This gave it the opportunity to 
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develop leaders and to sustain them and their parties with taxpayers money, taxpayers in 
Namibia as well as South Africa and with the support of the powerful Security Forces and 
the government's propaganda machine. I IS 
This party had an established press and newspaper, also the technical skills to run an 
effective election machine and the funds, mostly from South Africa to finance it. With the 
factors abovementioned in its favour the OT A did as well as could be expected but had to 
be satisfied with the second prize, being the aim of at least preventing SW APO from 
attaining a two-thirds majority. But it was clear that the DTA would never again in future 
elections have the abovementioned advantages and its fragile aliiance would not stand the 
test of time. 119 
The OTA did well in the central and southern areas of Namibia, producing substantial 
majorities in most of the towns and their neighboring rural. The OT A had been an 
alliance of parties since its founding, each member party representing a 'population 
group' e.g. Hereros, Nama, Whites. Nevertheless, the OTA's election platform advocated 
a united and undivided Namibia, with no hint of provisions for 'group rights' or ethnic 
governments. The OT A mobilized ethnically at the leadership level, by allocating 
positions on the central committee with an eye to ethnic support. 120 
Many people supported the OT A because they did not want Wambo influence to spread. 
This could spread in various ways- for instance, by domination of the civil service, thus 
squeezing out others who had benefited in the past. Support for the OT A in the election 
of 1989 may possibly be interpreted as reflecting 'ethnic consciousnesses, based on 
historical experiences, access to resources, and regional affiliations, rather than a strong 
C I hn' PI lorma on et IC separateness. -
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In Mozambique, the elections transformed the country from a one party state to a 
democratically elected multiparty government with broad-based legitimacy. It ended 16 
years of brutal civil war and turned the warring factions from settling disputes by force to 
battling with words. The ethnic factor also played an important role in the elections 
result. These elections ended in victory for both parties, Frelimo won the presidential and 
legislative elections in a process accepted by the international community. Renamo, 
"defeated," won a stunning victory in legitimizing itself: the 'bandits" proved that they 
represented almost four out of ten Mozambicans and the majority in the most populous 
provinces. 122 
The first point to note is that Frelimo won a crushing victory In the four Southern 
provinces. Such a massive vote means that there were not really any political currents: it 
is the community as such that has reacted. As a result, despite the fact that the Southern 
provinces (accept the capital) have only a modest demographic weight, Frelimo won 
about 45 per cent of its total national vote in this region. 123 
A second point has to do with Renamo's landslide victory in Sofala province, its absolute 
majority in Manica and Zambezia provinces, and its plurality in Tete and Nampula 
province. Renamo secured victories in the most populous provinces. All were areas 
where the resistance had been active in the civil war. 124 
A third point concerns the three provinces where the anti-colonial armed struggle was 
particularly intense. In Tete Renamo won, coming just short of an absolute majority. In 
the far Northern Provinces Cabo Delgado and Nissa, by contrast, Frelimo booked a clear 
but not overwhelming victory. Generally we can detect a very important pattern: Renamo 
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was much weaker where it lost than Frelimo was where it lost. Renamo was virtually 
excluded from some areas, while Frelimo was present almost everywhere. 125 
On the ethnic level, Frelimo benefited much more from the ethnic vote than Renamo. We 
can say that the Shangaan, Ronga and Tsua ethnic groups voted for Frelimo as 
communities: Frelimo' s scores in the areas where it predominates varied from 78 to 82 
percent. Renamo even in the districts where it won rarely attained such results: 54 to 77 
percent, i.e. usually below 75 percent. While the numerically modest Ndau group seems 
to have voted massively for Renamo, it would be completely false to say that the 
Makhuwas as such voted Renamo, and this is the largest etlmic group. By contrast the 
Senas, supposedly anti-Vandau and therefore pro-Frelimo, in reality voted in majority for 
the ex-rebels. It was the regional factor, not the ethnic factor that worked in Renamo's 
favour. 126 
Speculation was widespread that the Democratic-Union's gains resulted from the party's 
placement on the legislative ballot cOlTesponding to Chissano' s position on the 
presidential ballot. Although Renamo complained of fraud and discrimination throughout 
the process (with the deliberate intent, some believe, of discrediting the entire process), 
the party agreed to abide by the results. It claimed credit for forcing the first democratic 
multiparty elections and for bringing democracy to Mozambique. 127 
In the dominant democratic theory of today, the vote occupies a central place, and 
elections are the foundations on which the entire political edifice of democracy rests. 
According to this conception, it is through elections that citizens express their will, by 
periodically choosing their representatives and rulers. The vote is therefore personal act 
of the citizen-elector, which express his will. The international community stated that 
people voted from fear. People did not want to further provoke a return to war by denying 
power to a party that had been fighting for so long a time, and a party that was likely to 
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go back to war if it lost dismally, thus causing more suffering again, so people have long 
memories of this. The vote was not as such a reflection of the will of the people, but a 
vote out of fear. 128 
This assessment, made by an international observer, was true throughout the country. 
Mozambicans living in the bush and villages, who had been the main victims of the 
conflict, as well as some of the most cosmopolitan residents of the cities, were afraid of 
provoking with their votes, a situation that would mean a return to war. Afonso 
Dhlakama's repeated threats to withdraw from the peace process, to boycott the elections 
and to ignore the results set the tone. His army's dilatory demobilization, its hesitation to 
hand over weapons and communications equipment and to identify arms caches, and its 
persistent restriction on access to some of its areas gave substance to those fears. 129 
One of the things proven by this election result was the bipolarization of Mozambican 
political life, confirmed again by the fact that no other political force obtained a majority 
of the votes in any of the 148 districts that comprise the 11 constituencies. The trend 
resulting from these elections is towards the establishment of a de facto two party system. 
This is not surprising, since it fits in well with the spirit of the General Peace Agreement, 
which had already relegated all the other nascent political forces to a secondary role. 130 
As in the case of differing voting behaviour between urban and rural zones, here too 
explanation for the regional voting patterns should be sought in the country's recent 
history. It should be noted that the majority of Fre1imo's main historic leaders and many 
of its cadres come from the southern provinces, with certainly helped the population of 
these provinces to identify with this party. It was in the two provinces of the far north, in 
the so-called "liberated areas", that the struggle for independence was waged for the 
longest time, and where Frelimo' s politico-military presence was at its strongest. 
!28 Mozambique Freedom of Expression and the vote for peace. p. 12 
!29 Ibid. p. 13 











Frelimo's best electoral results came precisely from the districts of Maputo (with the 
exception of Matutuine, where Renamo had a very strong military presence in the closing 
years of the war), most districts of Gaza, and the Mueda plateau, one of the Frelimo's 
historical cradles, which gave Frelimo many of its fighters and military cadres· l3l 
During the liberation struggle, many Frelimo cadres from the central provinces were 
expelled or left the movement. Furthermore, the colonial authorities undertook a series of 
activities trying to halt the advance of frelimo' s guerrilla army into the center of the 
country, particulary through the training of special military units consisting essentially of 
Mozambican soldiers recruited locally. With independence, Frelimo's distrust of the 
population of these areas was further increased thanks to the war unleashed by the 
Rhodesian regime, which was later extended and Mozambicanized with the formation of 
the Mozambique national resistance (MNR, later Renamo) 
After independence, and particularly in recent years, Frelimo has come under strong 
criticism for marginalizing, or not giving sufficient national importance, to cadres from 
these regions. In general, there is a feeling among the elites of the center that Frelimo has 
marginalized them, and they were demanding a more balanced share-out of power. It is 
also significant that the great majority of the leaders of the small parties that fOlmed after 
1990 (and of some that existed previously) come from these provinces. Some were 
former members of Frelimo. 132 
The vote in support of Renamo, whose historic birthplace is precisely in the central 
region, where it scored its best election results (in Manica, Sofala and parts of Zambezia), 
thus expressed a feeling, shared by the people and the local elites, of exclusion, 
marginalization, from the Frelimo state. 133 
131 De Brito, L: Voting behaviour in Mozambique first multi-party election. In: Mozambique election. 
Democracy and Development. p. 446 












Namibia and Mozambique's first-multi party election took place under very difficult 
circumstances, and all Namibians and Mozambicans deserved high praise for its success. 
These elections were the culmination of a major success story in wider peacekeeping in 
Southern Africa under UNTAG and ONUMOZ auspices. Namibia and Mozambique's 
peace process has subsequently been cited as a model UN peacekeeping operation which 
could be adapted to post-conflict situations elsewhere. The post-conflict peace process 
was made possible by a mutually hurting stalemate. Neither the warring parties nor the 
population could afford the material and human costs of continuing the war. 
Neutral organizations and individuals played important roles through the process from the 
initial negotiations of the peace agreement through to the announcement of the official 
results. The presence of international observers and experts, and their willingness to get 
more involved, ensured that the administration continued to carry out the elections. Their 
presence and active participation also limited the possibilities for systemic fraud. Both 
voters and election staff were impressive in their commitment to voting and ensuring that 
everyone could vote. 
A striking feature of the two elections was that in both countries the voters or the parties 
did not in their campaign discuss the issue of which party would best govern the country. 
The political parties put more emphasis on their plans to win the election, and conduct the 
campaign more on a basis of issues. 
In Namibia and Mozambique, the broad electorate was not much interested in economic 
policy, although a majority of Namibians and Mozambicans being poor, unemployed or 
underemployed, and undereducated or illiterate. The voters were very much interested in 
promises of improvement in the material circumstances and economic opportunities. 











Newly emerging opposition parties were often suspicious vis-a.-vis the government or the 
ruling party, and the population insecure. 
In Namibia, a factor that could have seen the entire UN operation to Namibia end in 
failure was the delay in UNTAG's deployment. The UN's failure to prevent and respond 
to the fighting that broke out at the start of the operation was the most negative aspect of 
the operation, losing the UN significant credibility. The language also was seen as a 
major problem for UNTAG personnel, in particular, communication in local indigenous 
languages. It appears that it took some time before the UN was able to gain access to 
translators. The former leader of the DT A, Dirk Mudge, raised this issue. He believed 
that UNT AG could have been improved if it had included more personnel with some 
background and understanding of the conditions in Namibia, including people 
knowledgeable in languages. 
In Mozambique, one of the most problems was the lack of understanding at all levels of 
the electoral process. It was not just that few ordinary people really understood either the 
basis role of an election or the mechanics of voting; even the parties and candidates 
themselves often had only an insufficient notion of what was going on. Many party 
officials and candidates had not read the electoral law and were frequently surprised. For 
example, by the documents that had to be presented by candidates, by various deadlines, 
and by the fact that some parties would not be the same number of places from the top of 
the list in all provinces. Even Frelimo and Renamo made mistakes in these matters. 
The small parties of the unnamed opposition seemed to assume that political parties were 
leaders who collected money from the international community; there seemed to be no 
sense that political parties elsewhere in the world depend on their own members for 
resources and organizing. The nature of the peace process gave an advantage to the two-
armed parties. The party in government has an advantage in any election, while Renamo 
gained substantial amounts of money and assistance from the international community. 
By contrast, assistance to the unarmed opposition was tiny and tardy. But election can be 











And the small parties were simply too disorganized to make effective use of the 
opportunities available for campaigning. 
Another failure was the very high rate of blank and invalid votes, a mark not only of the 
lack of civic education, but also of the often poor or arrogant explanations given by 
polling station staff on the voting days. The weaknesses of civic education extended to 
the monitors, who often seemed not to understand the process any better than the voters. 
And their own training was limited, so that they did not clearly understand their role. 
More monitors, especially for the small parties, were only present because they were 
paid. Monitors should be members of parties who work at polling stations to defend the 
interests of their parties. The elections showed that a democratic exercise in Mozambique 
and Namibia was possible, but the leading positions of Frelimo and Renamo, SWAPO 











PART TWO: THE SECOND GENERAL ELECTIONS 1994-1999 
CHAPTER FOUR: ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION PREPARATIONS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the context and the conduct of the second multiparty democratic 
elections in Namibia and Mozambique. These elections crystallized a wider process of 
democratic consolidation that has been occurring within the last decade of the twentieth 
century. Although elections constitute one of only several parameters that constitute a 
democratic society, they reflect the work of several process that have occurring over a 
period of time and at different levels of society. Often these democratic processes are 
uneven, rough, and difficult. These elections represents the first experience in Southern 
Africa of a repeat multiparty election five years after the original internationally 
organized one and the first general election under the sole responsibility of Mozambican 
and Namibian authorities, without major international assistance. The first major test of 
Namibia and Mozambique young democracy came with elections for regional councils 
and local authorities. 
[n Namibia, the election was held between 30 November and 3 December 1992. The 
elections were reported to have been largely free of intimidation and their conduct 
appears to have exemplary, with no specific complaints of polling irregularities. This was 
the opinion of the independent foreign observers. Absolute majorities were won by 
SW APO in 32 local authority areas, by the DTA in eleven, and the UDF in the two local 
authority areas. The 1992 regional council and local authority elections were the first 
elections to be held in an independent Namibia. They were conducted by Namibians 
without outside assistance. 134 
134 University of Namibia: A Study of Voting Behaviour in the 1992 Namibian Regional and Local 











However, Mozambique's democratic record received its first setback with the local 
elections in 1998, opposition parties' boycotted municipal elections in protest over 
election administration issues and alleged fraud. Renamo initially claimed there were 
problems with the electoral law, and later that there was fraud in the voter registration 
process and other aspects of the election administration. None of the opposition parties 
managed to register their candidates in time or fulfill all the requirements necessary to 
field candidates in all races. As a result, Frelimo ran unopposed in 81 percent of the 
municipal assembly races and in 58 percent of the mayoral contests. 
The low turnout appeared to result from a combination of several factors, including the 
Renamo boycott, voter apathy, unfamiliarity with the new municipal governments, and 
dissatisfaction with the government performance. Finally, conduct of the elections was 
marred by strong accusations of irregularities, including ballot box-stuffing, and the 
election administration in general was severely criticized from all quarters. The victory of 
Frelimo mayors in all communities consolidated existing power structures at the local 
level and added to the growing alienation between the political leadership and its support 
bases. 135 Clearly Mozambique did not pass the first litmus test of democratization at the 
level of local government. 
4.2 NAMIBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS 
The formal integration into ::'-Jamibia of the deep-water port of Walvis Bay was widely 
welcomed. By the time of the 1994 Presidential and National Elections, a culture of 
reconciliation, social harmony and tolerance was well established. Progress had been 
made in raising living standards and considerable efforts had been made to stimulate 
investment and in particular to attract foreign investment. 136 
135 Andrea, E, 0: Mozambique the Permanent Entrenchment of Democratic Minimalism? In: Afdcan 
Security Review Vol. 10, No.1, 2001. p. 14 
136 Commonwealth Observer Group: The Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Namibia 7-8 











In Mozambique, the second Presidential and National assembly took place in a social, 
economic and political context significantly different from the one that surrounded the 
first elections in 1994. It has been widely said of the 1994 elections that Mozambique 
was dying and the people voted to ensure that the peace secured in Rome had come home 
to stay. Five years later, the war spectre seems to have significantly disappeared from the 
daily concerns of most people. Although the destruction and violence of war is still in 
people's memories, and is still a recurrent theme in political speeches, other issues have 
assumed greater relevance, mainly social and economic ones. A political analyst Eduardo 
Sitoe stated that, the biggest prevailing threat to the political stability in the country is the 
state of poverty suffered by most of the population. 137 
4.3 ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT 
The literature on elections in Southern Africa suggests that the nature of organizational 
structures for administering the electoral process is a decisive factor in determining 
whether elections will be of high quality and add legitimacy to democratic process or not. 
The presence of an independent electoral commission, with autonomous funding, 
appointment and organization procedures is here considered a key factor. 
In Namibia, The Electoral Commission (E.C) was established to oversee all state 
elections in the country. The E.C was five-man commission chaired by a judge of 
Supreme Court, Mr. G J C. Strydom (Chairperson) and four members: Dr. K G 
Abrahams, Ms. I Murangi, Mr. M. N eib and Mr. M L Shipanga, appointed by the 
president of the Republic. The E.C operated totally independently from any Government 
institution, although it was accountable to the head of state. The duties and functions of 
the Commission was to supervise and control the registration of voters; the preparing, 











publication and maintenance of national voters' register, the registration of political 
parties; and the conducting of elections. 138 
The secretary of the Commission is the Director of Elections (Prof. G K H Totemeyer). 
The Directorate of Elections operates as a division within the Prime Minister's Office; the 
Director is required to exercise and to perform the functions of the office subject to the 
direction and control of the Commission. The names of these members were gazetted on 
26 October 1992 (Proclamation 44 of 1992). The Commission has not changed its 
composition since its inauguration. 139 
In Mozambique, after the miserable 1998 municipal elections which were marred by low 
turnout and Renamo' s boycott, the major parties worked together to forge a new 
consensus election law, which was approved in December 1998. Given the controversies 
surrounding the voters list from the 1998 elections, a new registration was mandated, and 
all sides stressed the importance of having credible observers present during the 
registration exercise. 140 
The National Assembly passed a new electoral law (No. 3/99), which preserved the 
position of the CNE as the authority charged with the responsibility to undertake the 
supervision of the electoral process. This provides that the CNE is an autonomous body 
and is independent of all state authorities. A separate law (No. 4/99) made the provision 
for a restructured CNE and sets out its functions. It comprised 17 members, including its 
president (Reverend Jamisse Taimo, a Methodist pastor and rector of the High Institute 
for International Relations) appointed by the President of the Republic; eight members 
representing Frelimo; six representing Renamo; one representing the Democratic Union; 
IJ8 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs: Comments on the Namibian Presidential and 
National Assembly Elections. p. 2 
139 Totemeyer, G K G: Elections in Namibia. p. 15 











and one member appointed by the Government. Each Commissioner was assigned 
responsibility for a specific areas of the Commission's work. 141 
The CNE was structured at both the provincial and district levels where it is represented 
by Provincial Electoral Commissions (CPEs) and District Electoral Commissions (CDEs) 
in their respective areas to ensure that the electoral process, including the registration of 
voters, take place under conditions of complete freedom and transparency. In caring out 
its function of supervising the electoral process a permanent body know as the technical 
Secretariat for the Administration of elections, which the director-general heads, assisted 
the CNE. One of the most important functions of the ST AE during the electoral process 
was to organize the registration of voters, and Antonio Carrasco was appointed as the 
new director general. !42 
4.4 SUMMARY 
The conduct of the Electoral Commission became a matter of debate and controversy in 
both states during the election and after. The issue that really called into question the 
Commission's independence and neutrality was the 'running mate' issue, because the 
composition of the commission and the appointment of its members were not established 
on impartial lines. 
In Namibia, the criteria according to which the above members of the Electoral 
Commission were appointed by the president are unknown. Their party-political 
affiliations are also not known. They do, however, represent five different professions: 
the law, teaching, medicine, business, and the Public Service. All are Namibian citizens, 
as is required by the Act, including the Secretary of the Commission; it also happens that 
each member originates from a different language group in Namibia. The fact that the 
members were appointed by the president and answerable to him is continuously giving 
141 Commonwealth Observer Group: The Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Mozambique, 
December 1999. p. 8 











the opposition a reason to argue that the E C was not independent body but represent the 
interests of the ruling party.143 Under this procedure of appointment, the opposition 
political parties argued that SW APO could mismanage the elections. 
In Mozambique, the president of the CNE was appointed by the president of Republic, 
but the reason why he was selected by the head of state is also not known by the 
Mozambican population. After the failure of the 1998 local government elections, debate 
around the rules of democracy procedure gradually came to dominate public discourse in 
Mozambique. Actors from political parties, foreign agencies and from civil society were 
mobilized to become more involved in the running of the 1999 elections. The electoral 
law was changed to once again incorporate all parties represented in the national 
assembly in CNE and STAE at national, provincial and district level. The parties also 
agreed to conduct a completely new voter exercise in order to eliminate doubts about the 
trustworthiness of the existing registry. 144 
143 Soiri. I: SW APO Wins, Apathy Rules the Namibia 1998 Local Authority Elections. In: Multi- Pm1Y 
Elections in Afric~. p. 189 











CHAPTER FIVE: PRE-ELECTION ACTIVITIES 
5.1 ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
In a democratic society, the choice of electoral system is important because it influences 
the outcomes of elections. They are the most manipulative instruments because they 
determine how elections are won and lost. Democratic society calls for an open and 
accountable electoral system. All people in society must claim ownership of the electoral 
system and take responsibility for ensuring its openness and transparency. For the 1994 
elections Namibia opted for two methods, namely the proportional representative (PR) 
for the National Assembly and the plurality method for the presidential election because 
two elections were held in the country. 145 
The Mozambican electoral system for parliamentary elections was a party-list 
proportional representation. There were 11 constituencies, corresponding to the ten 
provinces in the country and the city of Maputo. The Electoral law adopted plurality 
method for the presidential elections. 146 
5.2 SUMMARY 
Two elections were held in Namibia and Mozambique, for the presidential elections both 
states applied the plurality method or the first-past-the-post method. The winner must 
obtain more than 50% of the popular valid votes, including the null and void votes. The 
proportional method was applied for the parliamentary elections. Namibia decided on the 
list system. Each participating party can nominate as many candidates as there are seats 
available (72) in the National Assembly, but must nominate a minimum of 24 candidates. 
When all the votes are counted, each party receives the percentage of seats equal to the 
percentage of votes that it has secured at the polls. 147 
145 Totemeyer, G, K, H: Elections in Namibia. p. 14 











Mozambican electoral system for parliamentary elections was a party-list proportional 
representation one. But votes were converted into parliamentary seats through the Hondt 
method. At stake in the election of the National Assembly of the Republic were 250 seats 
in a single chamber. The distribution of seats contested in each provincial constituency 
was determined not by the population density of each province, but by the number of 
voters who registered there. 148 
5.3 REGISTRATION OF VOTERS 
The purpose of the registration of voters is to enable the officials of elections to compile 
registers of those persons who, in terms of the Constitution and the Electoral Act, qualify 
as eligible voters in any elections. Building on lessons learned during the local and 
regional elections in 1992 and 1998 election officials worked to strengthen the electoral 
process. 
In Namibia, the voter registration process was simplified because the directorate of 
elections was able to use the registration list from 1992 as the base. 149 The directorate 
made substantial efforts to register all qualified voters and update the voter rolls. 
Registration officials were given strict orders not to register any person other than a 
Namibian citizen for these particular elections. This was necessitated by the fact that, for 
the purpose of the 1989 independent elections, evelyone born in Namibia, irrespective of 
their domicile at the time of the elections, could register .150 
To quality as eligible, a voter must be a Namibian either by birth, descent, marriage or 
naturalization. He or she must have reached the age of 18 years. All prospective voters 
were required to identify themselves by means of a photograph on some form of official 
document such as the officially issued Identity Document (10), a driver's license, or any 
147 Totemeyer, G, K, H. p. 13 
148 Da Silva, V: A summary of the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Mozambique, 1999.1n1 
Joumal of African Elections, Vol. I, No.1, 200L p. 98 
149 Commonwealth Observer Group: The Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Namibia 7-8 











official permit. 151 When the register was finally published on 1 December 1994, the 
number of registered voters stood at 654,189, which was judged to be about 89 per cent 
of the total number of eligible persons (788,382). The shortfall from the 750,000 who had 
registered for the 1989 independence elections was explained by the director of elections 
in terms of the large number of South Africans and other foreigners who had been able to 
vote in 1989. 152 
In Mozambique, the National Election Commission had set the period between 20 July 
and 17 September as the registration period. The elementary stages of the registration 
process were conducted in a smooth manner with more than half of the potential voters 
having registered by 23 August 1999. The voting population in 1999 was assumed to be 
approximately 8.3 million. A total of 7 099 105 people registered for the 1999 elections 
(85.5% of the eligible population) compared to 6.1 miHion people (78%) in the 1994 
elections. This increase in registration figures affectt~d the number of parliamentary seats 
allocated to each province. 153 
The registration exercise was observed by 3,520 local observers from the Fomm for Civic 
Education and the Mozambican Association for Democratic Development. International 
observers, from institutions such as the US-based Carter Center and the Electoral Institute 
of Southern Africa (EISA), also observed the registration process. However, the 
registration process faced a number of problems which led Renamo to state that the 
extension of the period of registration process was necessary because of the nature of the 
country's infrastructure; lack of transp0l1ation and communication facilities would make 
it difficult for Commission workers to reach remote areas in time. 154 
Registrants also cited long distances between registration posts as a hardship in many 
areas. Carter' observers also reported unclear roles of party agents at some registration 
150 Totemeyer, G, K, H: Ele;::Jions inNamibia. p.21 
151 Ibid. p: 22 
152 Ibid. p. 33 
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posts, as well as an inconsistent police presence at the posts. Finally, the team noted 
concern about the work conditions of brigade members, many of whom reported that they 
routinely worked entire days without food or rest. 155International observer missions and 
local observers, however, declared at the end of process that there was no systematic 
occurrence of the above problems and in most cases, the registration staff effectively 
managed the issues that rose. 
5.4 SUMMARY 
The registration of eligible voters is certainly on~ of the most important steps in the 
preparation of an election in order to ensure a minimum of fairness and transparency. 
Both states did not have a permanent and continually updated roll of voters but had to 
create this prior to every election. 
In Namibia, there was a lack of understanding of the registration process by some 
officials, and the Directorate promptly responderl to these problems by extending the 
registration period for one week to accommodate those who had been unable to register 
and to address other issues. Certain other voters failed to be registered for a different 
reason. Despite all the information disseminated by the Directorate of Elections, the 
media and political parties, many voters were under the impression that they could still 
vote with the voter registration cards issued to them during the UN-supervised elections 
in 1989. Many of these voters only realized too late that this was a false assumption. 156 
A factor which contributed too many problems was the unavailability of proper 'official 
maps indicating the constituencies' exact borderlines. Particularly in the Nortb, where the 
location of a road may change with the season, the borderlines became vague. Beacons 
indicating borderlines were never erected. In some cases, voters were mistakenly 
registered in a constituency neighboring to the one where they actually resided. In the 
154 Senzo, N: Mozambique prepares for the elections. In: ConJlj<;lIrt:'nds -No. 3/1999. p: 2 
155 The Carter Center: Observing the 1999 Elections in Mozambique. p. 11 











apartheid era, certain areas in towns and villages had fonnerly been designated as the 
black residential zones; the concept of a constituency was totally unknown. 157 
According to the leader of the Monitor Action Group (MAG), Mr. Koos Pretorius, at least 
50% of Namibia's white inhabitants failed to be registered, thus seemingly showing a 
disinterest in political participation. ls8 
In Mozambique, by contrast the National Elections Commission (CNE) did not agree to 
the proposal for the extension the registration period requested by Renamo and other 
opposition parties. The Commission maintained that the extension of the registration 
period would mean that the election would not be held on 3 and 4 December 1999. 
Another controversy arose when Renamo rejected a draft bill that stipulates that all 
citizens who turned 18 years of age on Election Day should be allowed to register as 
voters. This proposed bill contradicted the registration legislation that stipulates that only 
citizens who turn 18 on the last day of registration (in this case 17 September 1999) are 
eligible to register as voters. This viewpoint of Renamo was that the alteration of the 
legislation at this stage will disorganize the entire process leading up to the election. 159 
Emigrants have their right to vote stipulated in the Constitution. But the CNE decided 
that the registration would not be extended abroad because the conditions had not been 
met. Nobody can vote without having been registered and, so, as in 1994 the immigrants 
could not vote. 
Mozambique'S record in this regard since the 1994 elections has been constantly bad and 
there was no improvement for the 1999 multiparty election. Inevitably, the outcome of 
this complex process, the consolidated voters roll, was full of irregularities, a selection of 
which included the following: people's names were sometimes misspelt, so that they 
were denied the right to vote on election day. Some people's names appeared up four 
157 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs: Comments on the Namibian Presidential and 
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times on the same roll, thereby arousing suspicions that they could vote as many times. 
Some people who moved to another house and asked to be transferred to their new 
constituency, appeared on both rolls, while others did not appear where they expected to 
be. Sometime, entire blocks were registered in the wrong constituencies. These few 
examples of irregularities serve to underline the fact that the voters roll was certainly a 
failure. 160 
5.5 REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
In any ele~tions, political parties are the most important players. Electoral authorities 
recognize this and therefore ensure that all political parties are registered. The process of 
registration is organized in such a way that ensures participation. Once the party has 
complied with all provisions of the Act of election or electoral laws, the Director will 
submit its application to the Electoral Commission for approval. A certificate of 
registration is then issued by the Director of Elections. A political patty whose 
application has been refused by the Commission may appeal to the High Court. 161 
In Namibia, eight political parties contested this election: SW APO, Democratic Coalition 
of Namibia (a new group of disaffected DTA and CAN), DTA of Namibia, Federal 
Convention of Namibia, Monitor Action Group, SWANU of Namibia, United 
Democratic Front, and Worker Revolutionary Party. Only two parties, the DTA of 
Namibia and the SW APO Party of Namibia nominated candidates for the presidential 
elections: the DTA of Namibia Mr. M. Muyongo, and SWAPO, Dr S. Nujoma. 162 
In Mozambique, the following patties and coalitions were confirmed by the CNE as 
having fulfilled all the legal requirements to stand for the Presidential and National 
Assembly election after a number of party splits, and the formation and the collapse of 
electoral alliance: Independent Party of Mozambique (Pimo), Liberal Party of 
159 Senzo, N: Mozambique prepares for the elections. In: Conflict Trends-No.311999. p. 3 
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Mozambique (Palmo), Freedom Front of Mozambique (Frefmo), Labour Party (PT), 
Green Party of Mozambique (PVM), Democratic Party of Mozambique (Padelimo), Party 
for Liberal Progress of Mozambique (PPLM), Liberal Social Party (Sol), Partido 
Nacional Dos Operarios e Camponeses (Panacoa), Partido de Ampliacao Social e 
Soberenia de Mocambique (Pasamo), Democratic Union (UD), Democratic Union of the 
Opposition (Umo) and Renamo-Electoral Union (Renamo-UE). Joaquim Chissano, 
incumbent and head of the ruling Frelimo Party, and Dhlakama, leader of the malll 
opposition party, Renamo, were the only presidential candidates. 163 
5.6 SUMMARY 
In Namibia, eight parties contested the elections, but the main battle was always between 
SW APO and DT A. The number of smaller parties was reduced to just six, who between 
them obtained just 5.25% of the vote and a mere four seats. l64 In Mozambique by 
contrast, twelve political parties contested the 1999 presidential and parliamentary 
election, but Frelimo and Renamo were the two major organizations recognized. Ten 
small parties formed an electoral coalition with Renamo as the Renamo-Electoral Union, 
and Renamo was undoubtedly the main partner. Renamo-Electoral Union endorsed 
Afonso Dhlakama as its presidential candidate. All coalition members used the flag and 
symbols of Renamo in their electoral campaigning in exchange for the inclusion of their 
leaders in Renamo' s parliamentary electorallists. 16s 
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5.7 VOTER EDUCATION AND PARTICIPATION 
Educating voters about how to cast their vote and what their vote means is one of the 
most important functions of the electoral authorities, political parties, and the media, in 
any election. Among the information that needed to be conveyed to the public or the 
voters was the following: how and where to register and to inspect the voters' roll, how to 
make a complaint about the votes' roll, what was this election for-who was being elected, 
what were the constituency boundaries, where to vote and how to vote. 166 
In Namibia, the directorate of election with the co-operation of the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting (radio and television), the Namibia Institute for 
Democracy, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the University of Namibia, the European 
Union and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) of the United States had mounted an 
extensive voter education campaign around the main towns of the country. Political party 
agents also played an important and generally non-controversial role in assisting with 
education of voters. Even in the more isolated areas when asked whether voters 
understood the process, the agents of all parties were assured about the way they 
performed their duty. 167 
The Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), as the public broadcasting organization 
provided an active and unbiased role in educating voters about their rights, duties and 
obligations vis-a-vis the electioneering process. During the voter education campaign, the 
NBC radio broadcasted in nine languages to 95% of the population on FM and was 
therefore perhaps the most important media entity in the country, with unparalleled reach. 
Both main political parties told electoral authorities and the international observers that 
they especially appreciated the NBC's language services which, in the north for instance, 
enabled them to get their message across to a much wider audience. 168 
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In Mozambique, civic education was initiated by the CNE and the ST AE, and undertaken 
by various Mozambican NOOs, such as the Mozambican Christian Council (CCM), the 
Organization of Mozambican Workers (OTN) and the Forum of Civic Education 
(FECIV). Together they took the initiative to be actively involved in voter education and 
information. Workshops were organized for civic educationalists, and scheduled its 
programmes so that people were taught, first, how and why to register, and later, how and 
why to vote. Information was passed on through newspapers and posters, by radio-where 
drama, music, discussion, poetry and prayer were used to convey these and other 
messages about the democratic process. 169 
A small human rights network, (Mozambican League of Human Rights). relying heavily 
upon rural clerics, did civic education work in the countryside. While civic education was 
incomplete, the staff at polling stations made up for it on election day by explaining to 
people how to vote. l7O Radio Mozambique (RM) and Television of Mozambique (TVM) 
were during the period of civic education the primary medium for disseminating 
information in the country and the STAE's educational guidelines were established to 
ensure equal access for all the political organizations and a code of conduct was set up for 
its speakers. However, several other media houses were accused of biased coverage of the 
electoral matters. 171 
5.8 SUMMARY 
In Namibia, voter education was to encourage the public to vote by reiterating the 
importance of individual participation in democracy. This led all the electoral bodies to 
be involved in the production of radio talk shows, dramas, public service announcements 
and posters. Namibia has also been praised for being one of the few countries in Africa 
where the media is allowed to operate with genuine freedom. The Namibia Broadcasting 
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Corporation (NBC) decided to play an active role In nurturing Namibia's emerging 
democracy. 172 
An agreement was reached that the National Democratic Institute of the United States 
would sponsor all voter education activities, this contributed to the Directorate, political 
parties and different Namibians organizations, to once again inform people about their 
democratic right to vote for the patty and presidential candidate of their choice. There 
was broad agreement after the elections that voters were much better informed during the 
1994 elections than in 1992, as demonstrated by the small number of spoiled ballots. 173 
In Mozambique by contrast, the 1999 elections demonstrated that the overwhelming 
majority of voters knew how to vote. Many still had difficulties following the voting 
procedures and did not yet understand the meaning of the elections in the national 
political system and the CNE recognized that there were between 300,000 and 400,000 
spoilt votes. The voter education programme for the 1999 elections was conducted in the 
fonn of a campaign because three of the intemational NOOs that had actively supported 
voter education in Mozambique, the Democratic Institute (NDI), European 
Parliamentarians for Southem Africa (A WEPA), and the Frederich Ebert Foundation, 
ended their support. 174 
The voter education carried out in 1999 by the CNE, the ST AE, and the Mozambican 
NGOs was conducted over a short period and not in a more sustained fashion. The media 
gave special attention to the 1999 electoral campaign, Carter center, in its report on the 
electoral preparation, praised the Radio Mozambique and Television of Mozambique. It 
showed some improvement in the balance and impartiality of its coverage compared with 
1994. 175 
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CHAPTER SIX: CAMPAIGNING AND VOTING 
6.1 CAMPAIGNING 
Electoral campaigns are the competitive efforts by candidates and political parties to win 
Yoter support in the period preceding an election. Candidates use a variety of techniques 
to reach the voters, from public appearances and rallies to the use of mass media 
advertising. In the campaign, candidates work to get their messages out and to encourage 
voters to tum out and vote for them or their party. There are several campaign issues that 
can affect the freeness and fairness of the election. These include the timing of the 
campaign. ability to campaign, security for participants, and access to media. 176 
In Namibia, the campaign for votes certainly reflected the shortage of party funds, 
sometimes their almost complete absence. Meetings were few and far between and lightly 
attended. Apart from some small and badly positioned sign-boards, there were virtually 
no election posters. Party information was mainly restricted to sholt radio and television 
'spots' after the news every night for several weeks. Political advertisements were placed 
in the press, but their reach, like that of television, was mainly limited. The entire 
campaign period had been characterized by a calm and peaceful atmosphere, even in 
areas dominated by one political party or the other. 177 
In Mozambique by contrast, during the 1999 general elections, opposition parties once 
again remained dependent upon external sources of funding. as in 1994. This included 
both promised funds from government and supplemental funding from international 
donors. The provision of campaign funds by both the government and donors suffered 
considerable delays. The delays contributed to the slow start-up of opposition parties' 
campaigns, as these parties had practically no alternative sources of support. Funding for 
the smaller parties also was delayed by problems in their candidate lists and the 
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additional time required of the CNE to verify these lists. With about two weeks remaining 
in the campaign, the CNE distributed funds to the parties. Since the delays were not 
widely explained, they fostered accusations against the CNE and its status as a 
nonpartisan institution. 178 
The opposition parties argued that these delays tended to work to the benefit of the ruling 
Frelimo party, which obtained an unfair advantage. Frelimo countered that their party had 
mobilized support and campaign contributions and that opposition parties could have 
done the same. Although there were complaints and widespread evidence of Frelimo 
using government resources and personnel in their campaign, no formal complaints were 
submitted by the parties or other appropriate authorities. The opposition parties mostly 
were disorganized and relied heavily on donor-provided campaign support. In spite of the 
late disbursement of campaign funds, most parties campaigned quite actively and 
peacefully. However, campaIgn rhetoric between the two major parties was quite 
. 179 negatIve. 
6.2 SUMMARY 
In both states a recurrent problem in election campaigns seemed to be the lack of 
separation between the incumbent party and the state apparatus itself. Incumbency has 
obvious practical advantages in any electoral contest and in newly democratized African 
states the incumbent party has not shed away of using state resources to their own 
advantage. The advantage of incumbency has contributed to keeping the previous state-
carrying party continuing in power, as in Namibia and Mozambique. SW APO and 
Frelimo were accused by the opposition parties of using of the state resources in their 
own campaign, for instance by using government vehicles, or by unclear separation 
between state funds and political party funds. 180 
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The biggest weakness of the opposition in Namibia and Mozambique was that they were 
regional, at best, and tribal in orientation. Their hope was to unify their organizations. But 
because of their fundamental structures, they have consistently been unable to come 
together. In Namibia, the DTA had been an alliance of parties since its founding, each 
member party representing a 'population group', e.g. Hereros, Namas, and Whites. In 
Mozambique, some political analysts viewed Renamo as a mirror-image Ndau/Sena 
alliance of the central region. 181 
The consequence of the weakness of the opposition parties is that they are not likely to 
become institutionalize as organizations. When political parties do not institutionalized it 
means that it's impossible to evaluate parties on the basis of its past performance. They 
rest on the particularistic links between big men, or patrons, and their constituent 
communities. These parties did not care very much about presenting clearly 
distinguishable policy. For example the functioning of Renamo has remained almost 
totally in the hands of its president and closed to either external or internal analysis. 
Dhlakama himself embodies the core of the party, the unifying centre of a network of 
different groups who hardly communicate to each other. Groups such as the "Resistance" 
fighters who were in the bush; those from the cities, who had either been clandestinely 
active until 1992 or joined the party at the time; the former expatriates, also known as the 
'Lisbon group" who supported the guerrillas from abroad; and the demobilized soldiers 
as well as those who joined the new Mozambican army (FADM), who still see Renamo 
as their political referent. Internal rules have little relevance to the working of the party. 
While party congresses should be organized every two years, for example, none was held 
since 1994. In 1999 the re-structuring of the party was again marred by confusion and 
over-concentration of power and, once again, the personal whims of the party leader 
overruled formal regulations. 182 
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6.3 ELECTORAL ISSUES 
None of the parties seemed to have any coherent, readily available document on policy 
and programmes in both states. The only way to gather the main policy objective of the 
parties was through fragments of public interviews and pronouncements during the 
campaign. For all the pa11ies engaged in the elections, there were hardly any difference 
between the aims and policies. The international observers stated that in both states most 
of the political parties lacked the ability to express in which direction they wanted 
Namibia and Mozambique to move. They failed to explain why their political party was 
different from others and therefore what was the reason for them to exist. In the absence 
of real issues. the campaign was reduced to sloganeering, 'logoism', provocative insults, 
and sometime violence. Differences were clear in party logos, symbols and cliches. Party-
logos were everywhere, on caps, T-shirts, flags and cloths. 183 
Political parties should spend time to reflect on what exactly it is they stand for and how 
they differ from others. This could then be couched in an ideological statement that 
clearly specifies the party's perspective and vision on life in Mozambique and Namibia, 
which markedly different from other parties. Foremost among the national issues that 
formed part of their agenda was the need to develop the economy, and eradicate poverty. 
They clearly had difficulties when it came to atticulating their overall vision for the 
nation. They were preoccupied with securing the short-term survival and economic 
interests of their constituencies. As such, they had rarely been concerned about the 
medium and long-tenn goals of national development, such as capacity-building, 
sustainable development and population and environmental quality. 184 
The two general elections in both states confirmed SW APO and Frelimo as the countries, 
ruling parties and DT A and Renamo as the major credible opposition parties. Again a 
183 Nelson, S; Administration and Cost of Elections Project. p. 6 
184 Electoral Supervisory Commission/Legal Resources Foundation, The Conduct of General Elections in 











comparison of SW APO and Frelimo on the other hand and DT A and Renamo on the 
other. 
SW APO had free rein to campaign on a record of achievement as both a national 
liberation movement and as a government: campaign speeches emphasized the positive 
results of the government's policy of national reconciliation as well as its commitment to 
democracy, and further stressed the need to consolidate these gains made since 
independence. SW APO found itself in a position to emphasize the success of its 
economic policies (industrial development and export promotion) and the improvement it 
had brought to the standard of living, in particular to social services such as health, 
housing and education. The SW APO leader mentioned the reintegration of Walvis Bay 
and the offshore islands into Namibia and the construction of two important transnational 
roads, the Trans-Kalahari and the Trans-Caprivi highways. The campaigning also focused 
on job creation as the top priority for the coming years as well as pledging further support 
to new infrastructural programmes, particularly housing, electricity and water. 185 
Joaquim Chissano leader of Frelimo, by contrast started his campaIgn by listing 
Frelimo's achievements over the past five years, promised more reconstruction and 
progress in the next five and insisted that Frelimo was the party of peace and prosperity 
while Renamo would tum the country back and lacked the ability to keep Mozambique 
the fastest-growing countty in the region. He implied several times that Renamo \vas a 
party of war and destruction while Frelimo was the party of national unity. Chissano 
claimed that in the five years this country has developed roads, schools, hospitals, water 
supply and electricity. But most important of all we have achieved 10 percent economic 
growth with the lowest inflation rate in SADC. 186 
The next five years we concentrate on combating the causes of our people's poverty. We 
will try to end illiteracy with adult education and unemployment by creating more jobs. 
We will provide better health for everyone. In 1994, our average life expectancy was only 
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39, by 1999 it had reached 42 and we will do the things that are needed to raise it to the 
level of developed countries, said Chissano. Again Frelimo leader promised to fight 
disease and child mortality through better health and clean water; increase the number of 
schools until education is compulsory; develop the electrical system for the entire 
country, much of which remains to be electrified; assess a workable tax system to pay for 
better life combat crime, murder, corruption, bribery, drug abuse and domestic violence 
by empowering the police and law enforcement agencies. For this to happen we need 
peace and stability. No one must allow Renamo to stal1 the war again. IS7 
The ability to freely participate in the electoral campaign is " key election integrity issue. 
Opposition candidates must be able to circulate freely among their supporters and 
publicize their political platfOlTIls. Voters must be able to attend rallies, and other political 
events, without interference and without fear. They must also have free access to political 
information so they can make an informed choice when voting. A free and fair campaign 
is dependent on the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association. lss 
In Namibia, the DTA was totally unable to articulate and publicize any programme, as 
Du Pisani pointed out, that the party remained lumbered with an old identity, finding it 
impossible to overcome its image of complicity with a colonial power. The net result was 
that the opposition more or less failed to come up with new ideas and policies, having 
projected instead a diffuse and negative image of being anti-SWAPO. 189 
As might be expected, the opposition exaggerated the Govemment's shortcomings over 
the previous five years, attacking COlTUption in the ruling party, nepotism in the civil 
service, and the President's alleged smug authoritarian style. Yet it was unable to tum 
any of its criticisms in such a way as to put those in power on the defensive. The 
argument that aroused considerable interest was the 'danger' of a two-thirds majority, 
which would allow SW APO to amend the constitution against the wishes of the 
187 McCullum, H: Elections '99: Large Rallies Mark End of Official Mozambique Campaign. In: 
Sustainable Democracy. p. 3 











opposition. But only a small group of educated voters realized that this might constitute a 
threat to democracy. 190 
Like the party campaign Mishake Muyongo, leader of the DT A failed to point to any of 
the DTA's achievements. Instead, he chose to aggressively attack Sam Nujoma as a 
person, in a manner that can only be regarded as a breach of fair play. At one point 
Muyongo referred to Nujoma as a "dictator in waiting", and the danger of him becoming 
a "life president" if he managed to poll a two-thirds majority. Another occasion of 
desperate attack occurred in a nationally-broadcast television interview, when he even 
compared Nujoma to Hitler, "ifhe had been a white man" 191 
The Renamo campaign rested on the plank of the need for change. The Renamo party 
was conceived to bring a new prosperous and free democratic era to post-colonial 
Mozambique. An era of democratic principles and good governance which prioritizes 
human rights and individual liberty founded on a market economy; where the state is the 
referee under the rule of law; where there is a strong sustainable private sector. Dhlakama 
said at one of the Renamo rally that Frelimo has been in power too long; it is time for a 
change. Frelimo was attacked by the Renamo leader for its monopolization of the 
political power for its centralizing and undemocratic attitudes, and for the alleged 
. I' fl' I 192 mampu atIOn 0 e ectlOn resu ts. 
There has now been ten years of multi-party experience in Mozambique and the whole 
country has built a capacity and a will to strive for peace, development and political 
stability. However this capacity has not been truly harnessed by the present government. 
Frelimo has failed in Mozambique, failed to lower inequality, failed to reduce social 
exclusion and intolerance and fundamentally failed to make the achievements needed to 
further consolidate peace and democracy in Mozambique. The government and Frelimo 
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are corrupt and their officials have been harassing Renamo since the election call was 
made. 193 
Dhlakama claimed that "Renamo will win, and I will win the presidency". He roared but 
we have much to overcome. The state and Frelimo have been one for too long. They have 
abused their power and kept the opposition from receiving enough funds to campaign. 
We believed that it is urgent that we all unite around a program, which provides an 
alternative political agenda defining priorities, objectives and strategies and we delivered 
a peaceful change. Renamo was awarded of its political responsibilities for Mozambique 
and its people and invited all Mozambicans to join Renamo in order to build a country 
that will be free, prosperous and based on the rule of law. Dhlakama committed himself 
on behalf of Renamo to l::tecepting the results of the election, claming that Renamo was a 
patty of peace and that it would never return to war. His speech made few concrete 
promises except to continue Mozambique's economic growth. He concentrated on 
Frelimo's mistakes, cOlTuption and Mozambique's need for change. 194 
6.4 SUMMARY 
In Namibia, the entire campaign period, had been characterized by a calm and peaceful 
atmosphere, even in areas dominated by one political party or another. Political party 
rallies in most parts of the country had been properly supervised and orderly by the 
electoral body. In general the level of activity during the period of campaign was 
relatively modest and certain political parties complained that shortages of campaign 
funds had been a major constraint in getting their message across to the people of 
Namibia. 
These issues were largely absent from the coverage of the public campaign: management 
of the economy, land reform, living standards and unemployment, health, housing and 
social services, education and crime. Both the governing party and the opposition parties 
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campaigned essentially on SWAPO's record in government. SWAPO for its part 
emphasized the success of its economic policies, and improvements in standards of living 
over the past five years. It promised to make job creation a top priority for the next five 
years. The DT A and the smaller opposition parties for their part sought to persuade the 
electorate that the government in power had not done enough and, increasingly, as the 
elections approached, to question the integrity of the government and its commitment on 
certain issues. 195 
In Mozambique by contrast, while the 1994 was the reconciliation election, in 1999 the 
two main parties were more openly critical of each other during the campaign, and talked 
more about war. Frelimo for the first time referred to the war and said Renamo killed 
people; iI claimed success in post-war reconstruction and general economic growth. 
Frelimo charged that Renamo parliamentarians were deliberately preventing progress 
\vithout offering alternatives. 
Some go so far as to accuse Renamo of lacking political legitimacy since it has not held a 
pariy congress in over five years to approve its leadership or set policies. Its decision to 
join in a coalition of ten small parties was taken by small elite around Dhlakama and 
other long time Renamo members of the Assembly had to be removed from the 
proportional representation list in order to accommodate the new coalition members. The 
decisions on who was removed were taken by Dhlakama and six other senior Renamo 
leaders. The outcome has caused serious dissension among some party members. 196 
Renamo put great emphasis on the need for a change away from what it claimed was 
Frelimo corruption and abuse of power, and Frelimo' s failure to support the north and the 
rural areas. In general, the campaign was quite negative, with parties stressing that the 
other people were bad rather than making positive claims of what they would do if 
elected. In spite of the late disbursement of campaign funds, most parties campaigned 
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quite actively and peacefully. Campaigns were carried out mostly in provincial and 
district capitals, reducing rural voters' exposure to the parties' campaign messages. 197 
6.5 VOTING 
This chapter covers polling on the elections days, the counting procedures, and the 
announcement of the result by the Election Directorate. It also analyzes in some detail the 
results of the elections. 
In Namibia, the directorate of elections did an excellent job in organizing as many as 750 
polling stations across the whole country. The rush to vote was so high on the first day 
which had been declared a national holiday. The atmosphere around all polling stations in 
the country was peaceful, and there were few substantiated reports of intimidation or 
miscondu<;t. At most polling stations the mood of the Namibian people was quiet, even 
subdued., and without exception orderly and relaxed. 
There were no serious incidents even in the locations with a high percentage of illiterates, 
since adequately trained election officers were able to keep voters moving through the 
polling booths fairly quickly. Apart from few irregularities, both the casting and counting 
of votes proceeded without any major problems, fraud or political party protests, a view 
substantiated by the various groups of official observe.s from the Commonwealth, the 
Association of western European Parliamentarians for Africa (A WEPA), and several 
governments, who together visited several hundred polling stations. 198 
In Mozambique by contrast, on December 1999 Mozambicans went to the poll for the 
second time. The second general elections drew unusually high praise from both national 
and international observers. Since there was relatively high turnout on December 3, 
turnout on December 4 was lower. In most localities, observers reported that between 
--.----.-----
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70% to 80% of registered voters had voted by the end of the second day. On the second 
day the CNE announced that logistical problems in delivering materials had led to the late 
openings at some 77 polling stations in Zambesia, as a result, voting was extended to 
third day in all stations through out the country. 
On December 5, the Carter observers reported overwhelmingly that the voting process at 
the polls visited was orderly, tranquil, and efficient, with a few problems, and the initial 
assessment of the other observer missions was similarly positive. 199 The counting process 
at the polling station level began immediately after the stations were closed on the last 
day of voting in the presence of party representative and observers. Counting of 
presidential and parliamentary ballot papers was conducted separately, but the procedures 
were similar. One of the problems that occurred during the counting process was a lack 
of transparency throughout the entire electoral process, especially at the vote counting 
and tabulation stage.200 
6.6 VOTER TURl~OUT 
Despite all of the issues discussed above, the total response was impressive for a second 
national democratic election. Voter turnout is only one measure amongst many of levels 
of democratic political participation by citizens. Namibian and Mozambican eligible 
voters had shmvn a great commitment to democratic practice by turning out in large 
numbers to cast their votes. The turnout was unprecedented in both states for the second 
democratic elections. The predicted voter apathy happily did not occur. But more effort 
needs to be put into educating citizens and encouraging them to participate in political 
life. 
In Namibia 497,499 people voted in the National Assembly elections, and 497,508 in the 
presidential election; in each case this represented 76% of registered voters. The 
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announcements of the results were greeted with euphoria and resignation. SW APO 
leader, Nujoma, was re-elected president and SW APO had a two-thirds majority which 
could bring a constitutional amendment. The opposition complained about SWAPO's 
two-thirds majority and the dangers this could bring in Namibia's young democracy.201 
In Mozambique, the total number of voters in the presidential election was 4,934,352 and 
4,935,532 in the National Assembly, this represented 74% of the registered voters who 
voted. Chissano, was re-elected President of the Republic and Frelimo consolidated its 
parliamentary majority by obtaining 133 seats and Renamo 117.202 The Renamo-Electoral 
Union declared the results fraudulent and submitted a claim to the Supreme Court for a 
re-count of the ballots and requested the result of the election to be nullified. The 
Supreme Court responded in detail to each of the arguments raised by Renamo. It 
declared that the documentation provided by Renamo and the reasons contained in it were 
insufficient to nullify the election results or to justify a re-count of the ballots.203 
The Renamo-Electoral Union threatened to install parallel governments in the provinces 
where it won a majority of parliamentary seats, namely, Manica, Nampula, Sofala, Tete 
and Zambezia. A number of the smaller political parties in the Renamo-Electoral Union 
did not support the parliamentary boycott. On 14 January 2000, Renamo reversed its 
boycott stance and all parliamentarians took their seats during the first sitting of the new 
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6.7 COMMENTS ON THE ELECTIONS RESULTS 
A preliminary analysis of the Namibian election results confirmed the trend revealed 
three years after independence in the regional elections of 1992. SW APO has firmly 
established its leading role obtaining almost three-quarters of the ballots cast, and the 
opposition party has been badly mauled. Support for DTA, the strongest opposition party, 
which also put up Muyongo as its presidential candidate, fell from one-third of all votes 
in 1989 to one-fifth in 1994. And the smaller opposition parties fared even worse?05 The 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that falling voter tum-out has translated into a relative 
loss for the opposition and a relative gain for SW APO. Between 1989 and 1994 the 
opposition lost approximately 160,000 votes. Three credible explanations have been 
offered for this phenomenon, each supported by various factors. All agree that the 
contemporary political map of Namibia is mainly the outcome of changes in tum-out of 
voters rather than party preference.206 
Tens of thousands of eligible voters in the 1989 elections were not pem1anent residents of 
Namibia. In the 1989 elections, the opposition had the support of thousands of non-
resident voters who were not eligible to vote in the later elections. This accounts for part 
of the losses suffered by the opposition, although most of those in Walvis Bay have since 
become resident voters. 207 
The voter tum-out among potential DT A supporters was much lower than among 
SW APO supporters. The tum-out in 1994 was 21 per cent lower than 1989, 89 percent of 
eligible voters having been registered, as against 103 per cent at the time of 
independence. An analysis of voting patterns by region reveals that the tum-out in all 
DTA-dominated constituencies was lower than in SWAPO strongholds. In addition, the 
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new electoral laws reserve the vote to Namibian citizens, which excludes more than one-
third of all whites living in the country. 
Clearly the drop in the total number of ballots cast has been largely at the expense of the 
DT A and other opposition parties. Although there had been talk of people abstaining as a 
protest against certain governmental policies, party loyalty was very much in evidence 
during the 1994 elections. Surveys by writ and author confirm that the number of 
SWAPO supporters abstaining was far lower than among opposition groupS.208 
Only a small number of 1989 DT A voters have become supporters of SW APO since 
independence. SWAPO has gained some support at the expense of the DTA and the 
smaller parties, notably voters who were intimidated in 1989 by the Koevoet, by local 
headmen, or by white employers and farmers. These factors gave SW APO a two-third 
majority in the National Assembly.209 
In Mozambique, the distribution of votes in the 1999 elections repeated the pattern of the 
1994 elections. The results of the December 1999 election apparently showed an even 
more two-party pattern than that of 1994, for neither the UD (Democratic Union), nor any 
other minor party or grouping attained the 5% threshold to qualify for a seat in 
Parliament. The main parties each had "sanctuaries" where in 1994 they won more than 
75% of the vote. Frelimo's coincided with the areas in the south from where many of the 
pmty's historic leaders came, and the areas in the far north where the struggle for 
independence was waged for the longest, and where Frelimo established "liberated 
zones". 
Renamo's coincided with the central regions where their military activities began, and 
from where many of their cadres were first drawn; a sense of marginalization from the 
Frelimo state afflicting those areas has translated into voter support for Renamo, as well 
as identification with the leadership. While holding ground in their "sanctuary" areas 
208 Ibid. p. 357 











identified from the 1994 election results, the two main parties made inroads into their 
opponents' areas outside them. It has been pointed out that in six provinces the party that 
was runner-up in 1994 gained seats in 1999. Only in Zambezia did the gap between the 
parties grow significantly. However, the much more populous Zambezia stands second 
only to Sofala Province as a "Sanctuary" of Renamo support. In addition, four non-
Renamo political leaders stood on the joint Renamo-Electorate Union ticket, and the 
provincial gains may also reflect this fact. 
While Renamo' s strength still lies squarely in the central zone of the country (Manica, 
Sofala and Zambezia), and Frelimo's remains based in the south and in Cabo Delgado in 
the far north, three provinces in the centre and north are now closely balanced, with 
Renamo slightly ahead. Those three are Niassa, Tete and (large and important) Nampula. 
In fact, the two weightiest provinces in electoral terms demonstrated opposite trends in 
this last election as compared with 1994: Renamo gained further support in Zambezia but 
lost ground to Frelimo in Nampula. 210 
Electoral competition in Mozambique also reflects the conflictual legacy of the regional 
divides that the country developed during its anti-colonial struggle and the subsequent 
civil war. The regional polarization of the Mozambican society is exposed by the results 
of the first two multiparty elections. In the 1999 elections, the geographical distribution 
of the seats won by the two major parties varied only marginally. With the exception of 
Niassa, the sole province where majority support shifted from one party to the other, 
election results confirmed the strong and stable regional roots of both Frelimo and 
Renamo. In most provinces, the dominance of the two main parties was so overwhelming 
that the environment was of political homogeneity, with a huge majority of the people 
living in the same area (a province or, even more, a district) voting in the same way in 
favour of one party or the other, so that the average Mozambican voter lives among and 
knows only people who support the same party and candidate.211 
210 Giovanni, M, C: Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo party system. In: 
}Y.Qf!.<ing Paper No 23. 2003. p. 1 











Mozambique has a two-party system clearly centred on the competition between Frelimo 
and Renamo. Since the new constitution was adopted in 1990, a number of minor parties 
have sprung up, but they made few inroads into an electorate shaped and dominated by 
the Frelimo-Renamo cleavage, a deeply-rooted source of political identities generated by 
h ' fl' 212 t e country s past con lctS. 
6.8 CONCLUSION 
In both states the international observers were impressed with many aspects of the 
Namibian and Mozambican election process, including the level of civic involvement, 
public enthusiasm to participate in elections witnessed by the increased levels of voter 
registration, participation in political party activities, the commitment displayed by 
individual and election officials, and the generally safe conditions under which the voting 
was conducted. The observers concluded that the election process appeared to reflect a 
commitment toward democratic values and processes. But at the same time problems did 
occur during the run-up of elections: 
In Namibia, a formal complaint was lodged with the High Court of Namibia by the DTA, 
charging that irregularities occurred in the elections, and asking that an independent audit 
be conducted of votes in certain regions and 90 ballot boxes that were returned unsealed. 
The complaint, which centered on four polling districts in three northern regions where 
the number of ballots cast exceeded the number registered voters, included affidavits 
alleging inconsistent practices throughout the voting and counting process. 
In Mozambique by contrast, the credibility of the process was undermined by a series of 
technical problems that emerged during the tabulation of votes, which fueled political 
suspicions and split the eNE. The problem was compounded by a lack of transparency 
during the final stages of tabulation preceding the announcement of the official results, 
and by the limited technical monitoring capacity of the parties' agents and 











representatives. Although Renamo rejected the results, the fact that it contested the final 
results through established legal channels, and that due procedure was followed in 











CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
In the course of the 1990s, elections came to be seen not just as a means of choosing 
representatives and changing governments, but as a form of conflict resolution. While 
there is no doubt that if well-designed and implemented elections can play this role. 
Elections in a post conflict setting are fundamentally different from those organized 
under normal circumstances. Post-conflict elections are designed to facilitate, or to 
symbolize, an end to intrastate conflicts, but post-transition second elections are designed 
to assess if the culture of democracy gathered strength and maturity in the post-conflict 
society. 
Namibia and Mozambique were post-conflict societies because the first multiparty 
elections occurred after the negotiation of peace accords that involved most of the parties 
to the conflict. The case study of the above countries demonstrates that without 
substantial international assistance, elections would not materialize. The international 
community provided three types of assistance in all cases. First, it provided financial 
assistance for planning and holding elections. Second, and equally important, was 
technical assistance, which the countries desperately needed because of lack of 
experience and expertise. 
Finally, the international community provided political assistance III restructuring 
political pa11ies and strengthening organizations of civil society; at the same time, it 
enhanced the integrity of the electoral process and the credibility of its outcome by 
deploying international monitors. In a climate of deep mutual distrust and antagonism, 
the international presence helped prevent gross irregularities and widespread fraud. These 
elections were the culmination of a major success story in wider peacekeeping in Africa 
under United Nations auspices. Namibia and Mozambique's peace process has 
subsequently been cited as a model UN peacekeeping operation which could be adapted 











UNT AG and ONUMOZ were blessed with adequate resources. Although money was 
surely wasted in places, it was at least available whenever needed to finance the peace 
process. Donor generosity was partly due to Mozambique's long term popularity with 
certain donors, particularly the Nordic countries, who supported the process as part of 
anti-apartheid efforts in Southern Africa. The cost of post-conflict elections has been 
exceptionally high, given the widespread poverty and paucity of resources in the 
countries. The cost of UNTAG and ONUMOZ and their peacekeeping-related operations 
was in the region of $ 900 million, (UNTAG: $ 416 000 000, ONUMOZ: $ 510.252.500). 
Similarly, UNTAG and ONUMOZ were essentially a political operation. Their basic 
mandate was to ensure free and fair elections could be held in Namibia and Mozambique. 
Creating the conditions for such elections required UNT AG and ONUMOZ to carry out a 
wide variety of tasks, many of which went well beyond those previously undertaken by 
more traditional peacekeeping operation. 
Above all, lJNT AG and ONUMOZ had the political task of ensuring that a major change 
in political atmosphere took place so that there could be a free and fair campaign in a 
fully democratic climate. Numerous changes in law, attitude and society had to take 
place. Namibia and Mozambique had had no tradition of political democracy and had 
been subjected to a harsh and discrimination system of administration for long time. 
UNTAG and ONUMOZ task was to ensure that, despite this, the people of the country 
could feel sufficiently confident, free from intimidation from any quarter, and adequately 
informed, to exercise a free choice as regards their political future. 
In achieving the political targets of the Namibian and Mozambican peace agreement, 
UNT AG and ONUMOZ were a remarkable success. As already noted, UNT AG was an 
essentially political operation whose central function was to create the conditions for fee 
and fair elections to be held in Namibia, a territory which had endured more than a 
hundred years of colonial rule and had had no previous experience of such elections. All 
UNTAG's activities were designed to serve this central function; all were subordinate to 











transition from illegally occupied colony to sovereign and independent state. UNTAG 
thus had to play its part in monitoring and implementing a ceasefire, the withdrawal and 
demobilization of troops, monitoring a local police force, managing a political 
normalization process, supervising and controlling the resultant elections and assisting 
the transition to independence. 
The foundation for the success of such operations remains, as ever, the full cooperation of 
the parties, the continuing support of the Security Council, and the timely provision of the 
necessary financial resources. 
It is generally accepted that ONUMOZ was a successful political and humanitarian 
mission. Politically the leaders of the two Mozambican parties to the GP A remained 
committed to the end-state of the process, but they were helped along by a population 
tired by war and famine. While the electoral and, to some extent, political success of 
ONUMOZ cannot be denied, the neglect of military and security issues has already had 
significant negative consequences for the country and for the broader Southern African 
region. One of the pertinent lessons which have emerged from the ONUMOZ experience 
is that the military terms of any peace agreement need to be subjected to aggressive, 
intrusive outside oversight, rather than passive monitoring. 
On the human side, the situation was so terrible that the will for peace among the 
population had created a basis for non-conflictual relations between the people and the 
peacekeepers. The leadership of the warring parties had frustrated the people of 
Mozambique to the extent that they needed to redirect their loyalties to other institutions 
which were able to solve their problems. Although there were some areas where local 
population were exploited or economies distorted, the humanitarian and peace building 
activities ofONUMOZ provided a very real source of hope. 
Namibia's expenence with the elections began with the lIN-administered national 
elections in 1989 that led to Namibian independence. The 1989 elections were followed 











significant improvements have been made to Namibia's election system. Namibia's 1992 
Electoral Act, together with the 1994 Electoral Amendment Act, compares with 
international electoral standards. These elections were a credit to the people of Namibia 
and demonstrate that in the short time since this country gained its independence in 1990 
the culture of democracy has gathered strength and maturity. 
Campaigning in the 1994 elections was characterized, according to international 
observers, by political maturity, tolerance and a culture of democratic practice. The 
international observers were impressed by the balanced news coverage of the state 
broadcaster, as well as SWAPO's recognition of the distinction between the state and 
government in its use of public resources and the absence of intimidation that 
characterized the 1989 elections. Election officers should be congratulated for their 
performance during the poll and the count. Their dedication and efficiency were critical 
to the success of the elections. The regular meetings of political parties with the 
directorate of elections promoted dialogue and helped to foster a constructive 
atmosphere. 
The election procedures were widely understood and this would indicate that the voter 
education programmes conducted by election authorities and the political parties 
themselves were effeetive. The most serious criticism of the poll was expressed by the 
DTA leaders; they believed that voting figures in four northern Namibian constituencies 
were in excess of registration totals. The DT A's objection eventually resulted in 
litigation; the Court found that there may have been evidence of irregularities: it did not 
suggest that these might have been on a scale to substantially alter the outcome of the 
election. 
Most observers and political analysts agreed with the directorate's contention that the 
surplus votes being placed in the wrong boxes and hence counted in with the ordinary 
votes in the constituencies concerned. The international observers also expressed 











Mozambique's first multi-party elections in 1994 took place against three decades of 
war. With substantial international oversight through the United Nations, the 1994 
elections returned the ruling Frelimo to power, although the former rebel movement 
Renamo surprised many observers with their strong showing at the polls. These elections 
were widely hailed as a vote for peace and reconciliation. The 1998 local elections 
demonstrated alarming weaknesses in Mozambique's democratization process. For one 
thing the decentralization of power to local government, which was to accompany the 
local government elections, did not take place. 
Instead control over the local areas, including the appointment of municipal presidents, 
disbursement of money and the pace of change and development, was still directed by the 
central government. This led to tensions in local areas where the electorate raised 
questions over the value of their vote. These elections were less successful and marked by 
protests and a Renamo boycott over alleged irregularities in voter registration and only 
15% of Mozambicans voted. 
The problems encountered during the municipal elections of 1998 encouraged the 
Government to consider and propose changes to the legislation in preparation of the 1999 
general elections. Some revisions of the law regarding voter registration took place to 
allow a new census, which was to be informatised in order to allow easy updates for use 
in all forthcoming elections. The legal framework put in for the 1999 general elections 
aimed at assuring free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections in the 
context of consolidating peace, democracy and national unity in the country. 
Analyzing the electoral management in the context of democratization it's important to 
note that the three multiparty electoral processes that the country went through were 
marked by an intensive institutional and legal dynamic. The CNE had a different 
formation and president for every election and ST AE each time a new Director General. 
Each time it was necessary to promulgate a new electoral law, a new registration law and 
a new law for the CNE. The original decree on STAE (09/03/94) was revoked in 1995 











The 1999 general elections were an important test of Mozambique's democratization, and 
more generally, of its transition from war to peace and national reconciliation. Technical 
preparations for the elections, including the registration process and poll worker training, 
were well-managed and implemented. Although there were problems during the 
campaign, including some serious incidents of violence and extended delays in the 
disbursement of campaign funds, the political parties campaigned widely. The elections 
themselves were peaceful and orderly with high voter turnout and results that revealed a 
tightly contested race between two strong parties and candidates. 
Nevertheless, the credibility of the process was undermined by a senes of technical 
problems that emerged during the vote counting at provincial and central level, which 
fueled political suspicions and split the eNE. The problem was compounded by a lack of 
transparency during the last stages of tabulation preceding the announcement of the 
official results, and by the limited technical capacity of the parties' agents and 
representatives. Opposition and some international observers claimed that access to the 
observation computer and hardware and software was limited or even denied, and the 
ST AE blamed them for incompetence and breaching of their mandates. 
The consequence was that Renamo-Electoral Union did not accept the results. All in all 
Mozambique's road to democracy has not been an easy one. The country still remains 
confronted by the ghosts of the civil war and any move toward consolidating democracy 
remains a long, slow, and sometimes even stagnant process. To this end the absence of a 
truth commission with no integration of the past has to some extent heightened the 
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